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Noncomparabilities & Nonstandard Logics 
 
Robert Hockett∗ 
 
Cornell University 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Several theorists of justice have called attention to a vitiating 
contradiction besetting John Rawls’s treatment of “primary goods” and their relation to 
“lifeplan”-satisfaction among persons.  Rawls effectively claims, these critics observe, 
that (1) primary goods indices are interpersonally ordinally equivalent; (2) primary goods 
indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are intrapersonally ordinally 
equivalent; and (3) degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are not interpersonally 
ordinally equivalent.  These three claims are jointly inconsistent.  John Roemer, in 
particular, shows them so via an elementary function-theoretic proof by reductio ad 
absurdum.   
A natural objection that a Rawlsian might be tempted to offer to Roemer and 
other critics is that a standard mathematical (or any other) proof by reductio in the 
present context is illicit.  For such proofs proceed implicitly on the basis of semantic 
bivalence and the Law of Excluded Middle.  And a claim of interpersonal 
incomparability, such as (3), implicitly rejects at least one of these classical logical 
“laws” via its treatment of certain prospective comparisons as simply undefined, hence, 
semantically empty.   
It is therefore a matter of some interest that a somewhat “softened” version of the 
Rawlsian contradiction is derivable in all of the familiar three-valued, supervaluational, 
intuitionist and modal logics that reject bivalence, Excluded Middle or both.  As a 
number of formal proofs offered in the present article demonstrate, the tension in Rawls’s 
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treatment of primary goods and their relation to the successful pursuit of lifeplans is 
“deep” and robust.   
But it turns out that Rawls is spared contradiction, and his intentions to present a 
“political, not metaphysical” conception of justice best carried out, when, pace Rawls 
himself, both the second and third listed Rawlsian propositions are reformalized pursuant 
to a nonclassical logic.  Such logics indeed appear, even for reasons apart from 
consistency, to constitute the most appropriate means by which to model Rawls’s 
politico-pragmatic understanding of the appropriate distribuendum – an index of primary 
goods – and its relation to citizens’ plural conceptions of the good in a liberal theory of 
justice.  A broader lesson is that nonstandard logics offer the best means of modeling 
relations among propositions postulated by any similarly – epistemically or “politically” 
– modest, “pragmatic” conception of justice or political morality.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In his remarkable survey of theories of distributive justice, John Roemer 
demonstrates a critical inconsistency in John Rawls’s treatment of “primary goods” and 
their relation to “lifeplan”-satisfaction among persons.1  In a thoughtful draft article now 
folded into a separate piece co-authored with the present writer, Mathias Risse 
conditionally endorses Roemer’s finding, and argues that one of the three Rawlsian 
claims serving as premises of the derived contradiction both a) is the only one that might 
plausibly be dropped, and b) can indeed safely be dropped, without thereby vitiating 
Rawls’s basic understanding of primary goods and their role in a political/contractarian 
theory of justice.2 
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 The three Rawlsian premises, as characterized (though not in all cases as worded) 
by Roemer and Risse, are that: 1) primary goods indices are interpersonally ordinally 
equivalent; 2) primary goods indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are 
intrapersonally ordinally equivalent; and 3) degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are 
not interpersonally ordinally equivalent.   
Intuitively, the inconsistency argument runs: If two people’s primary goods 
indices must, ceteris paribus, either rise, fall or remain unchanged together when the two 
people hold identical ordered pairs of consecutively held bundles (1), and if each of these 
person’s degree or level of lifeplan-satisfaction must, ceteris paribus, rise, fall or remain 
unchanged with his primary goods index (2), then by transitivity of the equivalence 
relation the two people’s degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction must themselves, 
ceteris paribus, surely rise, fall or remain unchanged together (with their primary goods 
indices) as well – which is inconsistent with (3).  Formally, the derivation of the 
inconsistency found by Roemer and endorsed by Risse takes the character of an 
elementary function-theoretic proof by reductio. 
Now a natural, if perhaps somewhat radical, objection that a Rawlsian might be 
tempted to offer to Roemer and Risse is that a standard mathematical proof by reductio in 
the present context is illicit.  For such proofs proceed implicitly on the basis of semantic 
bivalence and the Law of Excluded Middle (or tertium non datur).3  And a claim of 
interpersonal incomparability, such as (3), implicitly rejects bivalence and/or Excluded 
Middle via its treatment of certain prospective comparisons as simply undefined – hence, 
of prospective claims stating such comparisons as semantically empty or indeterminate.  
(Interpersonal comparisons would lack standard semantic valuations – truth or falsity – 
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rather as expressions of the form “∀/0” lack numerical referents or fail to connote 
functions defined over certain salient domains, and thus as sentential units containing 
such expressions themselves lack standard semantic valuations.) 
Another natural, if rather less radical, objection initially open to Rawlsians is that 
Rawls’s statement of the relation between primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction – 
premise (2) – is misformalized in the Roemer and earlier Risse discussions.  For as he 
states the relation, Rawls’s understanding of it looks to be not one of equivalence, but one 
of simple entailment – i.e., not of biconditionality, but of uniconditionality.  The 
implicative relation runs from primary goods to satisfaction, but not from satisfaction to 
primary goods.4  (Of course, it therefore also would run, by contraposition, from the 
denial of satisfaction to the denial of primary goods; but that is not equivalence, and even 
contraposition might be jeopardized if bivalence and/or tertium non datur were denied.5)  
It is therefore a matter of some interest that (a somewhat softened version of) the 
inconsistency derived by Roemer and endorsed by Risse also is derivable in sundry three-
valued, supervaluational, intuitionist and modal logics – and this even when proposition 
(2) is weakened to a uni-, rather than a bi-, conditional characterization of the relation 
between primary goods indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction.  I provide a 
number of representative such derivations in the present paper.  Part 2 derives the 
contradiction in standard first-order quantificational calculus – the logical counterpart to 
Roemer’s function-theoretic argument.  Part 3 derives the contradiction in several well-
established 3-valued logics – those of Łukasciewicz, Bočvar, Smiley, Kleene and 
Woodruff.  Part 4 indicates how the preceding proofs carry-over into, e.g., van Fraassen 
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supervaluational logic, Heyting intuitionist (or “epistemic”) logic, and the standard S4 
modal logic.   
Each of Parts 3 and 4 briefly explains the possible reasons that, and the senses in 
which, the particular formalisms employed might be thought suitably to express the 
Rawlsian intuition that degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are interpersonally 
incommensurable.  In Part 5 I conclude that these results, far from constituting mere 
formal curiosities, bring into particularly sharp relief the deeply problematic nature both 
(a) of Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction 
among persons, and (b) indeed of any claim simultaneously involving pessimism (or in 
Risse’s case, optimism) about the interpersonal tractability or salience, and optimism (or 
in Risse’s case, pessimism) about the intrapersonal tractability or salience, of the 
“subjective element” of well-being.6  For it turns out that the contradiction is avoided, 
and a coherent rationale for charitably revising the set of Rawlsian premises best 
articulated, only when the second Rawlsian premise is recast (not dropped, pace Risse) 
with the third, for essentially the same reasons, in effectively trivalent form. 
In effect, the contradiction dealt with here is simply a case study of a more 
general point.  The broader lesson here is that certain nonstandard logics offer a 
potentially useful means of modeling relations among propositions postulated by any 
epistemically or “politically” modest conception of justice or political morality.      
 
2. Standard, Two-Valued First Order Formalization 
 
The derivation of Roemer’s inconsistency in standard, two-valued first order 
quantificational logic is quite straightforward.  The proof that follows makes use of the 
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following familiar sentential operators, connectives and quantifiers7:  (The conversant 
reader may of course skip over or skim the remainder of this paragraph.)  For “¬” read 
“not,” or “it is not the case that.”  (I thus use “¬” only as a sentential operator, not as a 
direct modifier of predicate expressions or as immediately forming class-complements.  
The same holds for the next four operators.)  For “∧” read “and.”  For “∨” read “or.”  For 
“⊃” read “implies,” or “entails”; hence for “∀ ⊃ ∃” read “∀ implies/entails ∃,” or “if ∀ 
then ∃,” or “∀ only if ∃.”  For “∀ ≡ ∃” read “∀ and ∃ imply/entail one another,” or “∀ if 
and only if ∃.”  For “∀x: …,” read “for all x’s, …”; hence, e.g.,  for “∀x,y: xΜy” read 
“for all x’s and all y’s, xΜy,” or “all x’s and y’s stand in the Μ relation.”  For “∃x: …,” 
read “There is an x such that …”; hence, e.g., for “∃x,y: xΜy” read “for some x and some 
y, xΜy,” or “some x and y stand in the Μ relation.”  (I introduce two particular “Μ 
relations” below.)  I generally separate “atomic” sentential components of longer, more 
complex “molecular” sentences by means of dots rather than repeated parentheses.  More 
dots accompanying a connective indicate that the connective possesses a broader scope.  
Thus, for “∀ ⊃ ∃ .≡. ( ⊃ ∗,” read “(∀ ⊃ ∃) ≡ (( ⊃ ∗)”; for “∀ ⊃ ∃ .: ⊃ :. ( :v: ∗ .⊃. , ∧ .,” 
read “(∀ ⊃ ∃) ⊃ (( v (∗ ⊃ (, ∧ .))),” etc. 
For ease of exposition and ready intuitability of what are, after all, some rather 
elementary formal statements, I also adopt two specialized relational operators (stand-in’s 
for “Μ” above) to characterize relations between 1) pairs of primary goods bundles 
hypothetically held by separate persons; 2) pairs of primary goods bundles hypothetically 
held by, and associated pairs of degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction thereby yielded 
to, individual persons; and 3) pairs of degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction 
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hypothetically achieved by separate persons:  For “>o/i,” read “objectively equals or 
exceeds for person i.”  For “>s/i,” read “subjectively equals or exceeds for person i.”   
For “objectively” here, one might just as well read “interpersonally” or 
“intersubjectively”; and for “subjectively” one might just as well read “intrapersonally.”  
I intend no more metaphysically controversial distinction than that which I take to be 
implicit in Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction, and which I take 
to underwrite Roemer’s (and Risse’s) use of the distinct functional expressions “:i (x)” 
and “ui (x)” respectively to represent the primary goods index number and degree or level 
of lifeplan-satisfaction associated with individual i’s holding the primary goods bundle 
x.8  By twice indexing the single relational term “>” rather than once indexing each of 
two separate functional operators such as “: (x)” and “u (x),” I hope (with perhaps a dash 
of heuristic optimism) to render the formal derivations that follow both easier on the eye 
and readily verbalized in simple English at no cost to critical detail. 
The “readily verbalized” versions of Rawls’s three claims concerning primary 
goods and lifeplan-satisfaction can be named and informally stated as follows: 
 
1) Primary Goods–to–Goods (“Objective”) Ordinal Equivalence: Any one primary 
goods bundle objectively equals or exceeds another such bundle for me if and 
only if it does so likewise for you – irrespective of who “you” and “I” are. 
 
2) Primary Goods–to–Satisfaction (“Objective”/”Subjective”) Ordinal Quasi-
Equivalence (i.e., Entailment): Any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or 
exceeds another such bundle for me (or for you) only if it objectively equals or 
exceeds that other bundle for me (or for you) – irrespective of who “you” are or 
“I” am. 
 
3) Non Satisfaction–to–Satisfaction (“Subjective”) Ordinal Equivalence: It is not 
(necessarily) the case that any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or 
exceeds another such bundle for me if and only if it does so for you – irrespective 
of who “you” and “I” are.9  
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 The three Rawlsian claims can be formalized, in the notation explicated supra, as 
follows.  Let the variables x and y range over primary goods bundles, and the variables i, 
j and k over persons.  Then: 
1) ∀x,y,i,j: x >o/i y ≡ x >o/j y.  
 
2) ∀x,y,k: x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y.  
 
3) ¬∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y. 
 
Inconsistency among the set of propositions (1) through (3) is readily derived as 
follows:  First, by assumption with a view to the familiar rule of universal-elimination,  
4) let x = m, y = n, k = a,  
 
so that, by (2) and (4), 
 
5) m >o/a n ⊃ m >s/a n.  
 
Again by assumption and universal-elimination,  
 
6) let k = b,  
 
so that, by (2) and (6), 
 
7) m >o/b n ⊃ m >s/b n. 
 
Once more by universal-elimination,  
 
8) let i = a, and j = b, 
 
 so that, by (1), (4) and (8),  
 
9) m >o/a n ≡ m >o/b n. 
 
Now assume: 
 
10) m >o/a n.   
 
Then by (9) and the definition of material equivalence as conjoined implications, and by 
conjunction- elimination and implication-elimination,  
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11) m >o/b n. 
 
But then by (7) and implication-elimination,  
 
12) m >s/b n. 
 
Now, by (3) and by dint of familiar logical relations obtaining between the existential 
quantifier, the universal quantifier, and the sentential negation operator, and of course 
still assuming bivalence, 
13) ∃x,y,i,j: ¬(x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).   
 
Thus, by dint of familiar logical relations among the sentential negation, conjunction, and 
implication operators,    
14) ∃x,y,i,j: x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y :∨: ¬ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y. 
 
Now again by assumption, this time with a view to existential-elimination,  
 
15) let x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b,   
 
so that by (14) and (15), 
  
16) m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n :∨: ¬ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n. 
 
Now by (12) and the familiar rule of negation-elimination (assuming bivalence)), we 
know that  
17) ¬¬ m >s/b n.   
 
So we know, by conjunction-elimination, that the first disjunct of (16) does not hold – 
that is, we know that 
18) ¬( m >s/a n .∧. ¬m >s/b n).   
 
So by (16), (18) and disjunction-elimination, we have  
 
19) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n. 
 
And thus in particular, by conjunction-elimination, we have  
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20) ¬ m >s/a n. 
   
But by (5) and (10) we have  
 
21) m >s/a n,  
 
which of course contradicts (20). 
 
 Apart from rejecting bivalence or tertium non datur, the only specific objection to 
this derivation that I can envisage being offered by a Rawlsian is to the use of universal-
elimination both to let k = a, then b, and to let i = a and j = b.  But this would not be a 
logical objection; and in fact it would amount to a denial of the Rawlsian premises 
themselves.  Because premises (1) through (3) are universally quantified and their bound 
variables i, j and k taken to range over all persons, there simply is no formal reason for 
prohibiting any two – or even all three – of the variables i, j, and k from taking the same 
value.  And assuming bivalence, to impose any restriction on any two such variables’ 
taking the same value would be none other than to deny the universality of (at least) one 
of the premises – i.e., to deny (at least) one of those premises themselves.  (We should 
have, that is, to say that the people for whom primary goods are interpersonally 
(“objectively”) ordinally equivalent cannot be the people for whom they and the lifeplan-
satisfaction they yield are intrapersonally (“objectively/subjectively”) ordinally quasi-
equivalent.  I.e., we should have to say that premises (1) and (2) cannot be said of the 
same people.)10  The only conceivable Rawlsian way out, then, would appear to be to 
depart from classical bivalence or tertium non datur. 
 
3. Three-Valued First Order Formalizations 
 
 Significantly, the “conceivable” way out proves not to be a felicitous way out.  
We can derive counterparts to the classical inconsistency just proved among Rawls’s 
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three premises in all of the familiar, plausibly applicable three-valued logics, as well as in 
all other plausible non-classical candidates sketched in the next two Parts.  In this Part I 
restrict myself to the trivalent logics.  A brief word might first be in order on why one 
might be tempted to employ a third semantic value in modeling the three Rawlsian 
premises and their logical relations.  (The reader is asked to skip over or skim the next 
subpart if well familiar with the standard reasons for rejecting classical logic.)  
 
3.1. Canonical Reasons for Rejecting Bivalence 
 
 “Third” semantic values typically are proposed as means of formally recognizing 
the possibility that syntactically well-formed statements might be neither true nor false.  
(They also are offered as means of assigning unique semantic values to “meaningless” or 
“nonsensical” – i.e., to syntactically non-well-formed – sentences, when such sentences 
are dignified with the term “sentences” at all; and as “pragmatic” revisions to classical 
logic made with a view to accommodating challenges posed to the distributive laws by 
quantum theory.  But these cases need not detain us; I can envisage no interesting 
Rawlsian analogue to either of them.11)  There are of course several well-known means 
by which a well-formed sentence may come to appear to lack a determinate classical 
truth-value: 
 1. “Paradoxical” specifications and resultant sentences:  The specification “that 
barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves” seems 
connotative, in that its component words, both severally and jointly in the order in which 
they figure, are readily understood.  And it seems connotative in that we can (at least 
vaguely) envisage sundry procedures by which to locate the nominative terms’ putative 
denotations and thus the denotation of the specification as a whole.  (We look for barbers.  
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We look to whom they shave.  We query who among the latter shave themselves.  Etc.)  
But when we inquire of such a barber whether he shaves himself, it seems that if he does, 
he does not, and that if he does not, he does.  It thus seems problematical to say of any 
sentence asserting that he does or doesn’t that it is determinately true or false.  And it 
therefore likewise seems problematical to assert that the specification, notwithstanding its 
connotation, bears a denotation.  (More on denotationlessness in its own right in the 
following paragraph.)  Similar remarks hold for sentences purporting to assert something 
of Russell’s “class of all classes that are not members of themselves.”12 And related 
examples abound.  (The Cretan “liar,” “this sentence is false,” etc.)  But “paradox” here 
means more than simple contradiction.  Drop the “not” from the second example and you 
have “the class of all classes that are members of themselves.”  Does that class belong to 
itself?  How would we ever find out?  There seems to be no procedure, even in principle, 
by which to determine an answer.  Call the sentence “undecidable.”  We might conclude 
that such sentences are not syntactically well-formed after all.  (And thus consign them to 
the “nonsense” heap.)  Or we might assign them a new semantic value.13          
 2. Missing term-referents more generally:  Expressions such as “my mother’s 
cousin,” “the largest prime,” or “the King of America” are connotative, in that their 
component words both severally and jointly in the order that they figure are readily 
understood.  And they are connotative in that we generally can (at least vaguely) envisage 
sundry procedures by which to locate the terms’ putative denotations and then predicate 
additional descriptions of them.  (One might learn that “my mother’s cousin,” for 
example, once one has traced the relevant branches of the family tree, also describes a 
well-known anthropologist, who now turns out to be my mother’s cousin.)  But such 
 13 
expressions also, of course, notwithstanding their success in connoting, might fail to 
denote.  There is no king of America, however surprisingly this might strike some; and it 
would seem as misleading either to affirm or deny any sentence formed by prefixing that 
specification to a sentential predicate as it would be to affirm or deny that a gentle soul 
had “stopped beating [her] spouse.”14  It would thus seem, at least for many purposes, 
misleading to ascribe either truth or falsehood to such sentences.15 
 3. Vaguely determined predicate-extensions:  The claim that “I got into a car” is 
true if I have buckled myself into a sedan.  It will generally be thought false if I have 
buckled myself into a helicopter.  But to claim either that it is true, or that it is false, if I 
have buckled myself into a jeep, might in many contexts seem misleading.  Likewise if I 
have dived through the opened window of the vehicle and my legs remain, kicking, 
outside.  Such cases, as well as the better known Sorites puzzle and other “paradoxes of 
induction,” might seem to call for many-valued or “fuzzy” logics, of which three-valued 
logics are a special case.16 
 4. Bivalence-entailed objectionable metaphysical (or epistemic) commitments:  
Statements of the form “two thousand years from now there will be a sea battle,”17 or “it 
would have rained at Marathon had the clouds been seeded,” or “there is a greatest prime 
number which, when two is subtracted from it, yields another prime number” might seem 
to commit their utterers to metaphysical (or epistemological) views that are plausibly, if 
not readily, to be rejected.  For it to be determinately true or false now that a sea battle 
will take place later, it might seem that there will have to be some feature of the world 
now in virtue of which the statement is, presently, true or false.18  But that would seem to 
imply that the future is now determined, and surely one may, perhaps even ought, reject 
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determinism.19  A similar objection might beset counterfactual claims.20  And the claim 
that it is determinately true or false that the twin prime problem will, or can in principle, 
be solved might look similarly to entail metaphysical determinism, Platonism about 
mathematical objects (and the knowledge thereof), or both.21  Those who reject such 
doctrines might be tempted to reject the bivalence that seems to underwrite them, at least 
with respect to the suspect classes of sentences. 
 
3.2. Rawlsian Reasons for Rejecting Bivalence? 
 
 I can see no applicability, to a prospective Rawlsian rejection of bivalence, of the 
argument from vagueness.22  I therefore provisionally dismiss that possibility for present 
purposes.  Rawls also does not appear able to reject bivalence by appeal – at least by 
direct appeal – to the denotationlessness of any thus-far considered specifications or 
singular terms.  After all, the “terms” here – “primary goods,” “fulfillment of life plans,” 
and the like – all are his own, and he surely purports to be writing about something.   
But there is an indirect way in which Rawls might be taken to appeal implicitly to 
the possible denotationlessness of terms or specifications: He can be taken to argue that 
certain conceivable, salient, and indeed oft effectively encountered specifications would 
or do lack referents.  Thus, for example, Rawls might seem by dint of some of his 
assertions concerning the “incommensurability of lifeplans” (or of the “conceptions of 
the good” expressed in them)23 to be committed to the denotationlessness of some such 
expression as “the ratio of my degree of lifeplan-satisfaction to yours.”  Expressions such 
as these might be readily analogized by Rawlsians to terms such as “7/0,” which fail to 
denote because the operations by reference to which the terms are partly formed – “/” in 
this case – are undefined over some domain an object of which – 0 in this case – also 
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figures, by name, into the term’s formation.  Ratio comparison over measures of separate 
lifeplan-satisfaction might then be thought simply “undefined” as is division by zero, 
even though the operations of ratio comparison and division (which seem indeed to 
amount to a single arithmetical operation, the one simply a particular application of the 
other) generally are defined over domains sufficiently broad as to grant them at least a 
syntactically well-formed status even in those few cases in which they are semantically 
undefined. 
 Yet this prospective Rawlsian argument from denotationlessness might seem a bit 
ad hoc and unconvincing as it stands thus far.  A simple case of fiat.  (Interpersonal 
comparisons are simply deemed undefined.)  For if we can understand an expression such 
as “the degree of lifeplan-satisfaction” (i.e., of one person’s such “degree”) and it refers 
to something (something numerical), then why, and in what sense, can we not understand 
a successfully referring “ratio-comparison of (two persons’) degrees [again, numerical 
things] of lifeplan-satisfaction”?  (Do we actually know, prior to calculation, that such 
forthrightly numeric ratios stand on a less secure footing than the square-root of two?)  
And if the (glib) reply is that we do not understand (an unreffering) “degree of lifeplan-
satisfaction,” but only the veritably referring “intrapersonal level of lifeplan-satisfaction,” 
then the obvious rejoinder is, why can we not understand a successfully referring 
“interpersonal ordinal comparison of levels of lifeplan-satisfaction”?24  A peremptory 
Rawlsian brush-off of the form, say, “because life plans are incommensurable” clearly 
would not do.  For, leaving to one side for the moment the obscurity of the notion of 
“incommensurable [even “mensurable”] lifeplans,”25 it is not lifeplans that we purport to 
compare, only their degrees, or levels, of satisfaction – measures that Rawls seems to 
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believe exist (at least intrapersonally – recall premise (2)).  And what is inherently 
incomparable about such seemingly objective, numeric things as (cardinal) degrees and 
(ordinal) levels?  
 Presumably, then, the Rawlsian would wish to argue against bivalence in matters 
of lifeplan-satisfaction-level-comparison not so much from the mere possibility or ad hoc 
stipulation of the unreferringness of terms or specifications alone, as from some 
paradox(es) or objectionable metaphysical or epistemic commitment(s) entailed by the 
very prospect of such terms’ referring.  What might such paradoxes or commitments 
be?26  And how are they to be avoided?  The proofs that follow will occasion skepticism 
as to whether any such means of avoidance that salvages either of premises (2) and (3) in 
their present forms can be coherently articulated.  Indeed, paradox is what seems to afflict 
the supposition that it can.  But I shall assume for the sake of argument – i.e., for the sake 
of the proofs themselves – that something might be so articulated.  And in Part 5 I shall 
both a) speculate as to what leads Rawls (and Risse) astray both in supposing that there is 
such an articulation and in seeking to accommodate it, and b) show that the only plausible 
articulation requires a non-standard reinterpretation of both premises (2) and (3). 
 
3.3. Implementing the Rejection of Bivalence 
 
Three programmatic decisions attend the formulation of a logic that rejects 
bivalence.  (The reader is again asked to skip over or simply skim the current subpart if 
well familiar with these preliminaries.)  The first is not strictly necessary but generally 
desirable if the logic is to be “useful” or “applicable,” i.e., if it is to reflect motivation by 
anything beyond Hilbertian considerations: It is prospectively to interpret, and often thus 
appropriately to name, in some intuitively appreciable sense, the added semantic value, 
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values or gaps that will figure into the new logic.  This decision of course follows 
directly, as a conceptual matter, upon considerations such as those just assayed with 
respect to why bivalence might be rejected in the first instance.  Thus, for example, if the 
value designated “T” or “1” is to be taken to mean “true,” and “F” or “0” to mean “false,” 
then one will wish to take the third value, say “I,” “U,” “N,” “1/2,” a blank space or such-
like to mean “indeterminate,” “unknown,” “unknowable,” “neither,” “both,” “in-
between,” “paradoxical,” or the like.  The choice of prospective interpretation often will 
guide – though of course it need not – the choice of valuational symbols themselves.  
Those mindful of possibly meaningful sentences with metaphysically indeterminate truth 
value might choose the valuation set {T, F, I}, “I” suggesting “indeterminate”; those 
more mindful of epistemic limitations and consequent unknowability the set {T, F, U}, 
“U” suggesting “unknowable,” etc.27    
The second programmatic decision is whether indeed to replace the standard, 
bivalent logic with a three-valued logic, or with a “gapped” or “supervaluational,” 
intuitionist or “epistemic,” modal or “contextual,” or some other non-truth-functional 
logic.  The choice between these options does not implicate any issue that need long 
detain us here, particularly as I shall show that the proofs derivable in trivalent cases 
carry over to the plausible alternatives.  Essentially, the choice between trivalence and 
some other plausible, non-truth-functional alternative reflects the “macro” choice 
between a) retention of finite semantic matrices – hence, retention of truth-functional 
semantics – at the cost of some lost classical tautologies (this is the three-value option);  
b) retention of all classical tautologies at the expense of accepting an infinite matrix and 
the consequent loss of truth-functionality (the supervaluational option); and c) sacrifice 
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either of finitary truth-functional semantics, of the classical tautologies, of complete 
axiomatizability, of interdefinable sentential connectives, or of some combination of 
these in the interest of some other – generally either metaphysically or epistemologically 
motivated – gain (the intuitionist or modal options).  I shall say a bit more about these 
trade-offs logic-by-logic infra, Part IV, as their relevances emerge.   
The third and final programmatic decision arises essentially only for veritably 
truth-functional, three-valued logics.  It is to determine what effect valuation, with the 
third value, of a sentential part of a more complex sentential whole will have upon that 
whole.  It is possible, for example, to take the complex proposition “∀ ∨ ∃,” when 
assigned the values “T ∨ I,” either to be true – because one of its components is true and 
this is all that is needed for the disjunctive whole to be true28 – or to be indeterminate – 
perhaps because indeterminacy (or, more plausibly, “nonsensicality”) of some part of a 
sentence ought for some reason to be taken to vitiate the whole.29  (“Green cheese yellow 
or I am happy” is perhaps as nonsensical as “Green cheese yellow” notwithstanding the 
sensicality of “I am happy.”)  In effect, such choices can be read as assignments of 
meanings to the sentential connectives – “and,” “or,” etc.30  Alternative ascriptions yield 
alternative logics.  I shall briefly characterize each such set of ascriptions in introducing 
each of the standard three-valued logics below.  What is more important for present 
purposes is that Rawls’s three claims – propositions (1) through (3) above – turn out to be 
jointly incompatible in all of them.  
 
3.4. Proofs 
 
  In laying out the proofs I make use of two new formal devices additional to those 
laid out in Part II.  The first is a new sentential operator:  For “∼” read an ascription of the 
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third semantic value, how ever we construe it, to the sentence that follows the operator.  
Hence “∼∀” will read “It is indeterminate whether [or “unknowable whether,” “neither 
true nor false that,” etc.] ∀ is the case.” 
 The second device I use is the familiar semantic matrix.31  By means of such 
tableaux I shall quickly characterize the meanings assigned by particular logics to the 
familiar sentential connectives.  (The reader is, one final time, asked to skip over or skim 
the current paragraph if well familiar with this means of characterizing the sentential 
connectives.)  That is to say that a matrix will reveal, at a glance, the content of what I 
just called the “third programmatic decision” implicit in each logic with respect to each 
sentential connective.  A simple three-valued matrix for the connective “≡”, for example, 
might look like:  
    
 
 
 
 
 
This table shows that, in the logic in question, the operator “≡” veritably links two 
simpler sentences – i.e., that the more complex sentence formed by the connective is 
assigned a “1” – when and only when those simpler sentences are identically valued.  The 
operator in this case is of course effectively bivalent, even if the sentences that it connects 
– which take values 0, .5, 1 – need not be.  “Infection” of material equivalence by the 
third value, that is, is minimal.  A policy of “maximal infection” of complex sentences by 
the third-valued parts would show itself in a modified matrix, namely, the preceding one 
save with its center row and center column of cells all taking the value “.5”:   
 
≡ 1 .5 0 
1 1 0 0 
.5 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
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And an intermediately infective policy might be to modify the last by changing the center 
value back to “1,” suggesting that indeterminates are indeterminately equivalent to 
determinates, but determinately equivalent to one another: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Further such observations can await consideration of particular logics. 
 We derive the Roemerian contradiction from Rawls’s three premises in trivalent 
logics as follows.  First, recall the first two premises: 
        1) ∀x,y,i,j: x >o/i y ≡ x >o/j y. 
 
        2) ∀k: x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y. 
 
Next, we must decide how to recast premise (3) in keeping with our hypothetical 
Rawlsian rejection of bivalence.  Two revisory candidates suggest themselves: 
        3’) ∼∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y. 
 
        3”) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y). 
 
The first connotes, in effect, that it is indeterminate/unknowable/neither true nor false to 
claim, etc., whether, for any two primary goods bundles and any two persons, one bundle 
subjectively equals or exceeds the other bundle for one person if and only if it does so for 
the other person.  The second connotes, in effect, that for any two bundles and any two 
persons, it is (affirmatively) indeterminate/unknowable/neither true nor false to claim, 
≡ 1 .5 0 
1 1 .5 0 
.5 .5 .5 .5 
0 0 .5 1 
≡ 1 .5 0 
1 1 .5 0 
.5 .5 1 .5 
0 0 .5 1 
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etc., whether one bundle subjectively equals or exceeds the other bundle for one person if 
and only if it does so for the other person.   
Candidate (3’) does not appear true to Rawlsian intentions.  Rawls doesn’t seem 
to hold that it is unknowable or indeterminate whether separate persons’ (“subjective”) 
satisfactions are interpersonally ordinally equivalent.  He seems rather to hold, 
affirmatively, that those satisfactions definitely are not comparable, i.e., in the language 
of trivalent semantics, that prospective comparisons, and thus ordinal equivalence, are 
affirmatively, definitely, inavertibly, necessarily indeterminate, unknowable, etc.  
Proposition (3”) therefore seems to be the more faithful rendering of the Rawlsian 
intuition that we are exploring.   
 It is worth observing that we needn’t actually resolve this question in the three-
valued case, however, at least not apart from questions of interpretation.32  For the only 
expansion that I can envisage for (3’) in any three-valued logic will itself be included in – 
it will be a proper part of – each of the expansions of (3”) warranted by those same 
trivalent logics.  I explain:  The only expansion that seems to make sense of (3’) is:  
        4’) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ x >s/i y .∨. x >s/j y. 
 
This comes of analogizing (3’) to (3) and making the “∼” in the former do the work of the 
“¬” in the latter (relying, of course, on the classical equivalence of “∀ ⊃ ∃” and “¬∀ .∨. 
∃”).  But the two disjuncts of (4’) – call them “(4a’)” and “(4b’)” – we shall see, are 
among the four disjuncts that figure into the expansion of (3”) in Łukasiewicz’s logic, 
and among the five disjuncts that figure into the expansion of (3”) in Bočvar’s, Smiley’s, 
Kleene’s and Woodruff’s logics.  Since each disjunct is, in effect, a Rawlsian way out of 
the inconsistency discovered by Roemer, to show that all (four or five) (3”) avenues are 
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blocked is per force to show that all (both) (3’) avenues are blocked as well.  On, now, to 
those avenues: 
 
3.4.1. Łukasiewicz 
 
Łukasiewicz’s trivalent logic is motivated by a concern over the earlier mentioned 
problematicity of future contingents (“there will be a sea battle …”).33  Because ascribing 
a determinate truth-value to statements involving such contingents seemed to him to 
entail an objectionable commitment to determinism, Łukasiewicz recommended 
ascription of a third semantic value – “I,” for “indeterminate,” or “possible” – to them.  
Łukasiewiczian negation of a true or false sentence accordingly yields a false or true 
sentence as in classical, bivalent logic, but Łukasiewiczian negation of an indeterminate 
sentence yields another indeterminate sentence.  Łukasiewicz’s other logical operators 
are semantically characterized as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∧ T I F 
T T I F 
I I I F 
F F F F 
∨ T I F 
T T T T 
I T I I 
F T I F 
⊃ T I F 
T T I F 
I T T I 
F T T T 
≡ T I F 
T T I F 
I I T I 
F F I T 
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Now we can expand (3”) Łukasiewicz-style simply by inspecting the semantic matrix 
associated with the Łukasiewiczian “≡” and determining which combinations of 
valuational assignments to two “atomic” formulae yield an “indeterminate” valuation to 
that “molecular” formula produced by connecting the two atomic formulae with the 
Łukasiewiczian “≡”.  Since any such combination is sufficient to confer the 
“indeterminate” value upon a complex sentence involving the Łukasiewiczian “≡,” the 
disjunction of all such combinations will be equivalent to the original “≡”-statement.  
Treating “∼” prefixed to a formula “∀” as the syntactic indicator of semantic valuation 
with the “indeterminate” value, “¬” of that with the “false” value, and “∀” standing 
alone that of the “true” value, we see that (3”) accordingly is equivalent to: 
4”) ∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y :∨: ∼ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y :∨: ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y 
:∨: ¬ x >s/i y .∧. ∼x >s/j y. 
 
It will prove convenient to separate the component disjuncts of (4”).  They are: 
 
        4a”) x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y. 
 
        4b”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y. 
 
        4c”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y. 
 
        4d”) ¬ x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y. 
 
We can now derive the Roemer contradiction in the new, less restrictive logic.  The 
object is to show that each of (4a”) through (4d”) is inconsistent with some entailment of 
premises (1) and (2).  First, then, again let x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b, k = a, and k = b, as 
we did in Part II, so that all of the salient assumptions and results posited and derived in 
connection with premises (1) and (2) in that part carry over to the present part.  In 
particular, then, we have (again),  
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        4) let x = m, y = n, k = a, 
 
        6) let k = b, 
 
        8) let i = a, and j = b, 
 
      12) m >s/b n.   
 
And from Part II’s (5), (10), and implication-elimination we have the previously 
underived: 
22) m >s/a n. 
 
These results hold independently of any consequences we derive from (4a”) through 
(4d”).  Now we derive some of those consequences.  From (4), (4a”) and (8), we have 
23) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.   
 
This and conjunction-elimination yield: 
 
24) ∼ m >s/b n,  
 
which (softly) contradicts (12).34  From (4), (4c”), and (8), we have: 
 
25) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n. 
 
This and conjunction-elimination yield: 
 
26) ¬ m >s/b n,  
 
which (firmly) contradicts (12).  From (4), (4d”), and (8), we have: 
 
27) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
This and conjunction-elimination yield: 
 
28) ∼ m >s/b n,  
 
which is the same result as (24), which as we noted before (softly) contradicts (12).  Now 
note that (4), (4b”) and (8) yield: 
29) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.   
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This and conjunction-elimination yield: 
 
30) ∼ m >s/a n,  
 
which (softly) contradicts (22).   
 We see, then, that in the Łukasiewicz system all four routes by which (4”), hence 
by which (3”), might avoid conflict with (1) and (2) are closed.  The (revised) Rawlsian 
premises fare no better in our remaining trivalent logics. 
 
3.4.2. Bočvar, Smiley 
 
Bočvar’s and Smiley’s third semantic value is designated, like Łukasiewicz’s, “I.”  
In Bočvar’s case, however, the intended reading of “I” is “paradoxical,” or “senseless.”35  
His concern is with properly valuing “barber,” Russellian set, Cretan liar and like 
paradoxes as discussed in III.A.  Smiley’s “I” reads “undefined” or “truth-valueless,” and 
is prompted by concern over sentences containing non-denoting terms, functions 
undefined over certain arguments, and the like – again as discussed earlier.36  (Smiley’s 
logic might therefore seem a natural vehicle through which to formalize a set of Rawlsian 
premises predicated on some form of incommensurability.)  Again, as with Łukasiewicz, 
negation of a truth or falsehood yields a falsehood or truth, that of a “paradoxical,” 
“meaningless,” “undefined” or “truth-valueless” sentence another of the same semantic 
type.  The other connectives are semantically characterized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∧ T I F 
T T I F 
I I I I 
F F I F 
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  Bočvar and Smiley also make use of an “assertion” operator (Smiley characterizes 
his as an “it is true that …” operator) which yields a truth when prefixed to a truth, a 
falsehood when prefixed to a falsehood or to a “paradoxical,” “senseless,” “truth-
valueless” or other such third-valued statement.  Bivalence is thus restored at a second-
order level, and a set of “external” connectives, each of them a counterpart to one of the 
just-characterized “internal” connectives, is defined on that basis.  (Hence, a “” prefixed 
to a truth yields a falsehood, and to an indeterminate or false sentence a truth; an “&” 
yields a truth when connecting two truths, a falsehood otherwise; etc.)  We need not 
dwell upon these “metasentential” matters, however, because any contradiction derivable 
in a “weaker,” three-valued logic of the “first order” can be expected likewise to turn up 
(in “firm” form) in the “stronger,” two-valued logic of the “second order” just as it does 
in the case of a bivalent first-order logic. 
 Roemer’s contradiction is again readily derivable in the Bočvar/Smiley logic.  
First, inspection of the semantic matrix for the Bočvar/Smiley “≡” reveals that (3”) will 
again entail the above disjunction (4”) of the four disjuncts (4a”) through (4d”), but now 
also will entail a fifth: 
∨ T I F 
T T I T 
I I I I 
F T I F 
⊃ T I F 
T T I F 
I I I I 
F T I T 
≡ T I F 
T T I F 
I I I I 
F F I T 
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        4e”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y. 
 
This formula disjoined with (4a”) through (4d”) will yield a new (4”) – call it “(5”)” – 
materially equivalent to (3”) in the new logic.  Since we have just shown the hypothetical 
Rawlsian “ways out” represented by (4a”) through (4d”) to be blocked, all that remains to 
show a Rawlsian escape from Roemer’s contradiction foreclosed in the Bočvar/Smiley 
logic is to show that (4e”), too, is blocked.  But this is readily done:  By (4), (4e”), and 
(8), we have: 
31) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
This and conjunction-elimination yield both: 
 
32) ∼ m >s/a n,  
 
which is our earlier-derived (30), and  
 
33) ∼ m >s/b n,  
 
which is our earlier-derived (24) (and 28)) again.  But (32) (softly) contradicts (22), while 
(33) (softly) contradicts (12).  So (4e”) is (“twice-softly”) foreclosed, and (3”) thus once 
again fails to cohere with (1) and (2) in a (now more permissive) trivalent logic.  Only 
two standard logics of that latter sort remain for Rawlsians to attempt. 
 
3.4.3.  Kleene, Woodruff 
 
Kleene’s concern is with indefinite partial recursive functions (relations in 
particular) and undecidable propositions à la Church and Gödel.37  His third semantic 
value – “U” – is accordingly to be read “undetermined,” “indefinite,” or “undecidable 
whether true or false.”  (My earlier-mentioned question as to the self-membership of the 
“set of all sets that are self-members” comes to mind.)  Woodruff’s “U” is to be read 
“undefined,” or “truth-valueless,” and is prompted by the same concerns as prompted 
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Smiley’s logic – viz., missing term-referents.38  Again, negation of a true or false 
sentence yields a false or true sentence, of an “undecidable,” “undefined” or “truth-
valueless” sentence another of the same semantic type.  The other sentential operators are 
semantically characterized as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Kleene’s case, the tables just provided characterize what he calls “strong” 
connectives.  Kleene’s “weak” connectives are as Bočvar’s previously tabulated 
“internal,” and Smiley’s “primary,” connectives.  (Kleene is thus thoroughgoingly – as it 
were “twice” – trivalent.)  Woodruff for his part takes the connectives as just 
characterized for “weak” or “internal” connectives à la Bočvar and Smiley, then provides 
“stronger” bivalent valuations as do the latter two logicians for sentences prefixed with 
an assertion operator which he symbolizes “T.”  Woodruff also makes use of several 
additional operators which further strengthen his second-order sentences but need not 
detain us here. 
∧ T U F 
T T U F 
U U U F 
F F F F 
∨ T U F 
T T T T 
U T U U 
F T U F 
⊃ T U F 
T T U F 
U T U U 
F T T T 
≡ T U F 
T T U F 
U U U U 
F F U T 
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Fixing attention on the matrix for “≡” in particular, we see that it is isomorphic to 
Bočvar’s and Smiley’s.  Accordingly, the Rawlsian premise (3”) will again, in the 
Kleene/Woodruff system, be equivalent to the five-termed disjunction we described and 
named “(5”)” above, and which we found to be inconsistent with (1) and (2).  Roemer’s 
contradiction accordingly turns up in the (first order of) the Kleene/Woodruff logic in 
precisely the way that it does in the Bočvar/Smiley logic. 
There remains one avenue to try.  How might a Rawlsian fare at the Kleenean 
“second order,” with Kleene’s “weak” connectives, after having come (“softly”) a 
cropper with the “strong” ones?  That is, what value will the Kleenean “weak” 
connectives assign to the derived contradictions themselves?  To answer this query, we 
simply conjoin the derived mutually contradictory formulae and assign those 
conjunctions semantic values pursuant to the Kleenean “weak” connective matrices, 
which as we noted are those that Bočvar and Smiley provide respectively for their 
“internal” and “primary” connectives.  The contradictions are: 
        C1):  (24) & (12); 
 
        C2):  (26) & (12); 
 
        C3):  (27) & (12); 
 
        C4):  (29) & (22); 
 
        C5):  (32) & (22); 
 
        C6):  (33) & (12). 
 
Owing to the equivalence of (24), (28) and (33), and of (30) and (32), these six 
contradictions reduce to (C1), (C2), and (C4).  Spelled out, they are: 
        C1) ∼ m >s/b n .∧. m >s/b n; 
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        C2) ¬ m >s/b n .∧. m >s/b n; 
 
        C4) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/a n. 
 
Assigning semantic values to each conjunct pursuant to the aforementioned scheme 
whereby the “¬” falsifies a formula, the “∼” “indeterminates” it and the absence of any 
prefix amounts to asserting the truth of the formula, and then valuing the conjunctions 
themselves pursuant to the rules characterizing use of the Bočvar/Smiley “∧,” we arrive 
at: 
        C1) I ∧ T = I; 
 
        C2) F ∧ T = F; 
 
        C4) I ∧ T = I. 
 
Since no “T”’s appear, we have no way out.  There is in the case of each disjunct of (5”) 
either a hard or a soft contradiction ((C1) and (C4) are soft, (C2) hard), and so Rawls fails 
via premises (1) through (3) to speak univocally even in the most permissive of trivalent 
logics, Kleene’s. 
 
4.  Briefly on Some Other Logics 
 
While three- (and other many-) valued logics are the most frequently encountered 
means by which formally to accommodate the objections to classical logic discussed at 
3.1, and to examine the implications of doing so, they are not the only such means.  In 
this part I briefly consider three other alternative logics that might be thought plausible 
means of salvaging Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction.  And I 
indicate how the proofs derived in the previous section carry-over into these alternatives. 
 
4.1. Supervaluation 
 
 31 
So-called “supervaluational” logic is an alternative means of accommodating the 
concerns that motivate many-valued logics without actually positing a “third,” or “nth,” 
semantic value.39  Rather than an “I,” a “U” or a “1/2,” say, in the standard semantic 
tableaux, suspect formulae receive a “gap” or blank cell – that is, no semantic valuation 
at all.  As a formal matter, this does not come to quite the same thing as a valuation with 
the “third” or “nth” value, a gap simply amounting to a third or nth symbol.  For 
supervaluation also involves a critical second operational stage following the initial 
assignment of semantic values and gaps.   
In that second stage, all constitutive “atomic” propositional formulae of a longer, 
“molecular” formula, what ever their de dicto or de facto valuations (or non-valuations) 
in the first stage – “T” or “1,” “F” or “0,” or blank – are hypothetically assigned, 
ensemble, all possible classical valuational combinations – that is, all possible 
combinations of “T”’s and “F”’s or “1”’s and “0”’s; and any complex formula which 
ends with a unique invariant valuation through all such combinations is supervaluated 
with that semantic value.  By this means all classical tautologies (and, by parity, all 
classical contradictions, which are simply negated tautologies) derivable in the standard 
bivalent logic are preserved in the new logic.   
The price, of course, is loss of truth-functionality – and consequent loss of the 
usability of finite matrices in semantic analysis – on the part of complex formulae.  That 
is, the semantic value of a complex, “molecular” formula no longer is mechanically 
derivable from the semantic valuations of its constitutive “atomic” formulae.  For while a 
formula such as “∀ ∨ ¬∀” would receive a supervaluation of “T” no matter what value 
were assigned “∀” in the first and second stages, and thus amount to a supervaluational 
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tautology, a formula such as “∀ ∨ ∃” would not; either of ∀’s or ∃’s being semantically 
gapped (i.e., truth-valueless, semantically empty) at the first stage would result in its – 
and the disjunction’s – remaining gapped at the end of the second stage.  That is, “∀ ∨ 
∃,” unlike “∀ ∨ ¬∀,” would be neither valuated nor supervaluated, for “∀ ∨ ∃,” unlike 
“∀ ∨ ¬∀,” is not a classical tautology or contradiction.  In a many-valued logic, by 
contrast, both of these formulae would be valuated, and the semantics of the connective 
“∨” thus fully truth-functional; but the tautological status of “∀ ∨ ¬∀” might be lost, as 
inspection of the matrices for “∨” laid out in III.D for all trivalent logics we have 
considered readily demonstrates. 
In light of the foregoing, it should be clear that supervaluational logic offers no help 
to Rawlsians in avoiding the Roemer contradiction.  Supervaluations differ from trivalent 
logics only in their preservation of classical tautologies in (“second stage”) semantic 
analysis.  Motivated by the same philosophical concerns as those logics, they do not 
independently affect the syntax of those logics or the application of those logics to 
particular problems.  We can see this perhaps most directly simply by systematically 
reinterpreting the tilde throughout the derivations carried out in Part 3.4.  Rather than 
reading it as ascribing the third semantic value to the sentence following it, read it as 
ascribing a semantically gapped status to the same.  The “hard” and “soft” contradictions 
derived in 3.4 are formally unaffected. 
 
4.2. Intuitionist Logic 
 
Intuitionist logic is prompted by concern to avoid certain objectionable metaphysical 
commitments of the sort discussed at Part 3.1 – or, perhaps, their epistemic 
counterparts.40  At the outset, that concern which most troubled intuitionists was classical 
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mathematics’ – and its associated classical logic’s – apparent commitment to Platonism 
and/or some epistemic analogue to Platonism.  Classical mathematicians and logicians, 
intuitionists believed, had misunderstood the nature of mathematic activity.  The latter, 
by intuitionist lights, was not the exploration of an independent realm to which mental 
access was incomplete, but the active construction of mental objects pursuant to certain 
“principles of thought” bearing a distinctly Kantian coloration.   
The intuitionist reinterpretation of mathematics lends itself to a reinterpretation of 
classical semantics, whereby “truth” comes to mean, more or less, “provability” or 
“consructability,” while “falsity” comes to mean something like “provability-not” or 
“nonconstructability” – the latter determined by the derivability of a (firm) contradiction 
from the assumption that a particular statement or object is in fact provable or 
constructible.  This in turn lends itself to a reinterpretation of classical syntax, in which 
certain classical laws – notably tertium non datur – no longer hold and in which many 
classical theorems accordingly are no longer derivable, the classical sentential operators 
therefore effectively redefined.  (The negation operator, for example, seems no longer 
simply to deny or contradict, but affirmatively to assert contrariness – i.e., to amount not 
to mere “reversal” of the truth-value of the proposition to which it is prefixed, but to 
independently warranted assertion that the proposition is affirmatively contraindicated.41  
The classical tautology “¬¬∀ ⊃ ∀” is thus lost, the rule of negation-elimination 
effectively relinquished.  As are many others.) 
Intuitionist principles have been extended to non-mathematical discourse by so-called 
“antirealists,” as well as, to a somewhat lesser extent, by certain “internal realists” and 
“irrealists,” who note analogies between the intuitionist view of mathematics on the one 
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hand and what it is to learn, understand and use any language on the other.42  Because to 
learn the meaning of and understand an indicative sentence is to learn and understand the 
conditions under which it is assertible, they reason, and because the conditions under 
which the familiar word “truth” is ascribable to such a sentence are themselves just those 
under which the sentence is assertible, the learning, use, and meaningfulness of language 
itself – which, after all, includes among its terms the learned word “truth” – amount to 
grist for a manner of Kantian “transcendental argument” to the effect that truth is none 
but assertibility.43  And since assertability is in effect a generalization of the notion of 
mathematical constructability, antirealists hold that the same logic advocated by 
intuitionists in the latter context ought to be applied – now, in some cases, under the 
name “epistemic logic” – in other linguistic contexts as well.  That is, intuitionist logic is, 
as a consequence of the workings of language, language-acquisition, language-
understanding and thus language-meaning themselves, the appropriate logic.  And its 
metaphysical and epistemic commitments (or non-commitments) constitute the 
appropriate metaphysical and epistemic stance.  Not only future contingents and 
counterfactuals, but even certain statements about the past – if there be no way in 
principle to ascertain their truth or falsity – might then be thought to be of indeterminate 
truth value.44 
The intuitionist denial of tertium non datur, and the conceptual tie between non-
ascertainability of truth-value (what we might, in honor of the neo-intuitionist antirealists, 
call “antireality”), on the one hand, and indeterminacy or unknowability on the other, 
suggest that intuitionist logic might amount to yet another means by which to formalize 
the Rawlsian premises (1) through (3) in conformity to Rawlsian intuitions regarding 
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commensurability.  And indeed, we can readily carry out this formalization.  The trouble 
for Rawlsians is that it does not help.  Here is why: 
Let us reinterpret the tilde utilized in Part 3.4 as an ascription, per intuitionist 
principles, of the non-ascertainability of the truth-value of the proposition which follows 
it.  Since the first two Rawlsian premises do not involve that operator, they do not 
implicate any logical rules peculiar to, or applications objectionable to, intuitionist logic, 
and all results derived from them in Parts 2 and 3 carry over to this Part.  The third 
Rawlsian premise, which does involve the tilde, would again then be formalized by the 
string that we labeled “(3”),” but would simply bear a (marginally) different intuitive 
meaning.  Call that intuitionist rendition of the third Rawlsian premise “(3I)”: 
        3I) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y). 
 
Unpacking (3I) pursuant to the standard Heyting intuitionist axiomatics,45 we derive: 
 
        4I) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ⊃ x >s/j y) .∨. ∼ (x >s/j y ⊃ x >s/i y). 
 
Appealing once more to universal-elimination and setting x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b, we 
have: 
        5I) ∼ (m >s/a n ⊃ m >s/b n) .∨. ∼ (m >s/b n ⊃ m >s/a n). 
 
This formula and the intuitionist interpretation of implication in terms of disjunction and 
unascertainability yield: 
        6I) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n :∨: ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n. 
 
But now note that the first disjunct of this formula is in essence just that which we 
labeled “(4a”)” in the cases of those trivalent logics utilized in Part 3.4.  And the second 
disjunct is just that which we labeled “(4b”)” in the same.  Both of these disjuncts, we 
saw, at least softly contradicted some formula derived from the first two Rawlsian 
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premises.  It appears, then, that intuitionist logic – which vis a vis Rawls amounts to a 
strengthening of the logics considered in Part III (because it offers only two, rather than 
four (Łukasiewicz), five (Bočvar, Smiley, Woodruff), or six (Kleene) prima facie “ways 
out”) – offers no escape from Roemer’s contradiction. 
 
4.3. Modal Logic 
 
There are conceptual affinities among certain terms-of-art used by advocates of 
trivalent and intuitionist logics on the one hand, certain common “modal” expressions on 
the other.  Thus Łukasiewicz, in semantically characterizing those future-contingent (“sea 
battle”) statements which he thought incapable of truth or falsity, sometimes used the 
word “possible.”  (He also objected to the ascription of determinate truth values to such 
statements because he believed that to be determinately true or false they would have to 
be “necessarily” so.46)  And intuitionists, who generally have spoken in terms of 
“provability” and “provability-not” or “constructability” and “non-constructability,” 
sometimes in parallel fashion use such terms as “possibility” and “impossibility.”  (A 
“constructible” object is, of course, an object that it is possible to construct.)  The 
question thus arises whether some rationale that might render a trivalent or intuitionist 
logic attractive to a Rawlsian might also lend some attraction to a modal logic, and 
whether such a logic might offer Rawls a way out of the Roemer contradiction. 
I think that we can dismiss this prospect for two reasons, one interpretive, the other 
formal.  The interpretive problem is that it is difficult to envisage much sense that might 
attach to a reading of the Rawlsian premises along modal lines that hasn’t already been 
assayed in formalizing them trivalently, supervaluationally, or intuitionistically.  Is the 
modal reading of (3) that it is “merely possible” that degrees or levels of lifeplan-
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satisfaction be interpersonally ordinally equivalent?  Is it that it is “impossible” that they 
be so?  Or is it that it is impossible to know?  What difference between any of these 
readings and the earlier-considered reinterpretations of (3) might we expect a modal logic 
possessed of the necessity operator “□” and the possibility operator “◊” to capture while 
the earlier-considered logics did not?  The last possibility – the epistemic (“impossible to 
know”) – seems to be the only one with any potential Rawlsian intuitive traction, yet this 
“epistemic” understanding already has been captured by the intuitionist logic.47 
The formal problem tracks the interpretive problem.  For, as we might expect in view 
of the conceptual ties between intuitionist “-abilities” and epistemics on the one hand, the 
modal notions of possibility and contextuality on the other, it happens that the standard 
modal logic, S4, is formally isomorphic to the standard Heyting intuitionist logic.48  That 
is, it has been metalogically proved that any well-formed formula is valid in Heyting 
logic if and only if its translation is valid in S4.49  (It has also been proved, not 
surprisingly, that standard modal logics, like intuitionist and supervaluational logics, lack 
finite characteristic semantic matrices.50)  There thus seems to be little hope of salvaging 
all three Rawlsian premises through reformalization in either classical or any plausible – 
trivalent, supervaluational, intuitionist or modal – non-classical logic.  Must we, then, 
abandon one of the premises, or might we reformulate more than one of them? 
 
5. A Plausible – and Intuitively Attractive – Way Out 
 
I wish to close with a suggestion as to how best to salvage Rawls’s treatment of 
primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction in a manner that is faithful to the Rawlsian 
intuition of epistemically, politically, or politico-epistemically necessitated interpersonal 
subjective incomparability.  (I do not here endorse that intuition, I only suggest how to 
 38 
carry it out more satisfactorily.)  Perhaps the problem captured by Rawls’s intuition stems 
not from its comparability aspect, but from its subjectivity aspect – i.e., not from 
interpersonal comparison as such, but from would-be reliably observable, somehow 
measurable, and politically cognizable private or subjective magnitudes more generally.  
It is difficult, when one pauses to reflect upon the problem, to imagine just what sort of 
actual observation, measurement  or moral-political problem not endemic to subjective 
phenomena tout court would be (uniquely) endemic to interpersonal comparisons of 
subjective phenomena.  Is the Rawlsian idea that there is some irreducible something that 
is not sufficiently “public,” “political,” observable or detachable from the person to allow 
for comparison of its “possession” or “attainment” by or quantitative attributability to 
separate persons, but that is, somehow, sufficiently well-understood, isolable, public and 
legitimately politically salient nonetheless to allow for such attributability to individual 
persons at different times?51  Would such an idea be practically or operationally 
coherent?  Its seeming near-inarticulability (as distinct from its formalizability) affords 
some grounds for skepticism, as do the formal results derived throughout this paper.  I 
want to suggest that the idea is not coherent, and that focusing upon would-be detachable, 
reliably observable and measurable subjective magnitudes as culprit offers a means of 
recasting the Rawlsian premises in a manner that is both intuitively intelligible and 
formally consistent. 
I think that the real Rawlsian intuition is that (“subjective”) lifeplan-satisfaction in 
some epistemic and/or normative-political manner defies, or at least somehow challenges, 
(even ordinal) quantification.  That intuition apparently engages, in Rawls’s case, at the 
point where satisfactions between persons would be compared.  But all, if anything, that 
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renders such comparison pragmatically or politically problematic, it would seem upon 
reflection, is the difficulty likely to attend any interesting form of satisfaction-
quantification.  It is the operational intractability, and/or perhaps the normative political 
irrelevance or inadmissibility, of consistently reliable observation, consideration, and 
measurement of ineluctably “private” or “subjective” phenomena.52   
I have in mind here three specific possibilities, any combination of which, I believe, 
might appeal to Rawlsian concerns associated with a “political not metaphysical” 
conception of justice.  First, the public inaccessibility of such privately privileged 
information as lifeplan-satisfaction assimilates it to mystical revelations and related 
phenomena associated with “comprehensive doctrines,” phenomena that Rawlsians 
believe do not belong in “the public sphere” or behind the “veil of ignorance.”  Second 
and relatedly, the inescapable “vagueness” or “imprecision” of quantification in regard to 
such phenomena also renders them impracticable distribuenda for purposes of 
implementable, political justice.  Finally, even were such epistemic and operational 
constraints not applicable, the familiar liberal conferral of “consumer sovereignty” and 
cognate statuses upon its subjects – treating each person as the sole authority as to the 
degree to which her lifeplan or desires are satisfied – presumably would bracket such 
information from public cognizance notwithstanding any hypothetical accessibility.  So 
both the “public” (“objective”) and “private” (“subjective”) sides of what we might call 
Rawls’s “wall of separation” would give reason to treat, and formalize, private matters 
differently than public in the realm of politics.  
Now of course there are sundry strategies, increasingly common since the turn of the 
last century, by which to attempt to get round the strictly epistemic aspect of the problem 
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– there are proposed incomplete (Paretian) social orderings, ordinal individual utilities 
ascribed on the basis of persons’ revealed preferences among goods vectors, “extended 
sympathies” from such preferences to the welfare of others, identification of “happiness” 
with theoretically measurable physical correlates such as C-fibres or endorphins, etc. – 
but none of these would seem in any practically appreciable way to validate Rawls’s 
second premise without calling into question his third (which, recall, denies even ordinal 
comparability of separate persons’ lifeplan-satisfactions).  And, of course, it is perfectly 
possible in a strictly conceptual, non-operational sense to distinguish, formally, between 
intrapersonal and interpersonal measurement:  There are, after all, those two formal 
premises themselves (premises (2) and (3)).  And there are well-known information- (or 
group-) theoretic means by which to give mathematical expression, and precision, to the 
idea that interpersonal comparison is one thing, intertemporal intrapersonal comparison 
another.53  But none of these strategies, how ever successful, would touch the “consumer 
sovereignty” or “liberal” aspect of Rawlsian political justice.  And again the point here is, 
in any event, that it is difficult, as an empirical, operational or even as a political-theoretic 
matter, to discern what fact or facts about satisfaction or subjectivity would render it the 
case that satisfaction is or ought to be treated as, e.g., intrapersonally cardinally 
measurable but not interpersonally comparable, or intrapersonally but ordinally 
measurable yet interpersonally fully comparable.54  Not all formally representable 
conceptual distinctions are epistemically, practically or political-theoretically significant 
– or even sustainable – distinctions.  So perhaps what a Rawlsian (or indeed any similarly 
oriented “political, not metaphysical” theorist of justice) ought to do, in order to retain 
both formal consistency and politico-pragmatic intelligibility, is either to abandon that 
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third premise altogether, or, more plausibly, to recast the second premise along with the 
third.55   
A reformulation of Rawls’s second premise in a manner consistent with the only 
rationale that might warrant his third – viz., an alleged politico-epistemic problematicity, 
perhaps a full-blown indeterminacy or unknowability, afflicting any quantitative or quasi-
quantitative claim (cardinal or ordinal) concerning such “private” or “subjective” 
phenomena as satisfactions – might look like this: 
        2”) ∀x,y,k: ∼ (x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y).       
 
   Appealing to our earlier applications of universal-elimination and preserving their 
results, we have (again): 
        4) let x = m, y = n, k = a,  
      
and: 
 
        6) let k = b. 
                           
These in conjunction with (2”) yield: 
 
        2a”) ∼ (m >o/a n ⊃ m >s/a n); 
 
and: 
 
        2b”) ∼ (m >o/b y ⊃ m >s/b n).                   
      
Unpacking these propositions via the semantic tableaux method employed in Part 3.4, we 
find that in the Łukasiewicz logic (2a”) is equivalent to: 
        3a”) m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n :∨: ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/a n, 
  
while (2b”) is equivalent to: 
 
        3b”) m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n :∨: ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n. 
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Parsing-out all four disjuncts, each of which represents a Rawlsian way out, as we did in 
connection with the proposition (4”) in Part 3, we have: 
        3a1”) m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n. 
 
        3a2”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/a n. 
 
        3b1”) m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
        3b2”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n. 
 
Unpacking (2a”) pursuant to the Kleene and Woodruff logics simply adds another 
disjunct, i.e., another possible Rawlsian way out.  Let us call it: 
        3a3”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n. 
 
Unpacking (2b”) in the same way yields the analogue: 
 
        3b3”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
Unpacking (2a”) pursuant to the Bočvar/Smiley logic affords two more disjuncts, two 
more Rawlsian ways out.  They are: 
        3a4”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. m >s/a n;  
 
and: 
 
        3a5”) ¬ m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n. 
 
The analogues in the case of (2b”) are: 
 
        3b4”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. m >s/b n; 
 
and: 
 
        3b5”) ¬ m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the first three and the fifth “a” disjuncts 
contradict the original Rawlsian premises (1) and (3) via our earlier derived (20), while 
the fourth “a” disjunct contradicts those original Rawlsian propositions via our earlier 
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derived (22).  Parallel reasoning would show the same to hold true of the “b” disjuncts.  
We cannot avoid Rawlsian inconsistency, then, by revising premise (2) alone.  Can we 
avoid inconsistency by revising both (2) and (3) pursuant to the revision of (3) proposed 
in Part 3 – (3”) – and to that of (2) proposed here – (2”)?  Indeed we can.   
While a full-blown metalogical proof of the joint consistency of (1), (2”) and (3”) 
might be marginally more reassuring, it should suffice here to argue intuitively.  First, as 
a general matter, note that all of the difficulties that Rawls encountered in Parts 2 and 3 
decisively involved (2).  That is, on each occasion that some entailment of (3) or (3”) 
contradicted some other derived formula, that other derived formula required (2) as one 
of its premises.  A suitable revision of (2), this suggests, might well be compatible with 
(3”), even though we have observed in the previous paragraph that it would not be 
compatible with (3). 
Next, to move to particulars, note that each disjunct of (4”) and (5”) discussed in 
Part III represented a prospective Rawlsian way out of the Roemer contradiction, a route 
that turned out to be closed by some entailment of (2).  But since our new (2) – (2”) – 
now also turns out to be disjunctive, it too offers a number of prospective Rawlsian ways 
out – two such in the Łukasiewiczian logic, three such (which properly include the 
Łukasiewiczian two) in the Kleene/Woodruff logic, and five such (which properly 
include the Kleene/Woodruffian three) in the Bočvar/Smiley logic.  If either of the two 
(2”) ways out are compatible with any of the four (3”) ways out in the Łukasiewiczian 
logic, then there is a Rawlsian way out in that logic once the original premises (2) and (3) 
have been revised to (2”) and (3”).  And since all of those ways out constitute proper 
subsets of the (more inclusive) sets of prospective ways out offered by the other, more 
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permissive trivalent logics, to show that (revised) Rawls passes through Łukasiewicz will 
be to show that he passes through any standard trivalent (or equally permissive, e.g. 
supervaluational, intuitionist or S4 modal) logic as well. 
Let us recall those earlier four prospective Rawlsian “ways out” via the 
Łukasiewiczian logic considered in Part 3.4, but let us fill in their free variables pursuant 
to (4) and (8) – which set x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b.  Suitably filled, the prospective “ways 
out” are:  
        4a”) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
        4b”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n. 
 
        4c”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n. 
 
        4d”) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n. 
 
Now note that (3a1”), above, conflicts with (4a”) and (4d”), but is compatible with (4b”) 
and (4c”).  Either of the latter two, conjoined with (3a1”), constitutes not just a 
prospective, but indeed a veritable Rawlsian way out of the Roemer contradiction.  Next 
note that (3a2”), above, conflicts with (4a”), (4b”), and (4c”), but is compatible with 
(4d”): Another Rawlsian way out.  Now note that (3b1”), above, conflicts with (4b”) and 
(4c”), but is compatible with (4a”) and (4d”), while (3b2”) conflicts with (4a”), (4b”) and 
(4d”), but is compatible with (4c”).  Whether, pursuant to (2”), we set k = a or k = b, 
then, we have three veritable Rawlsian-Łukasiewiczian ways out of the Roemer 
contradiction.  It follows that we have at least three ways out in any other alternative 
logic thus far discussed as well, for the Łukasiewiczian is the most restrictive of them.  
For the sake of completeness, however, we may as well take passing note of the 
other possible routes offered by the other trivalent logics:  Note, then, that (3a3”) is 
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compatible with (4b”) and (4c”), though not with (4a”) and (4d”), while (3b3”) is 
compatible with the latter two but not with the former two.  Whether k = a or k = b, then, 
the Kleene/Woodruff logic offers two additional Rawlsian routes of escape from the 
Roemer inconsistency.  That’s five ways out and still counting.  Recalling that Kleene 
and Woodruff (along with Bočvar and Smiley) allowed for a fifth disjunct in connection 
with (4”), viz. (suitably filled like (4a”) through (4d”)), 
        4e”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n,  
 
we note that yet another prospective Rawlsian way out in connection with (3”) is 
compatible with the following prospective Rawlsian ways out in connection with (2”):  
(3a1”) and (3a3”); parallel remarks hold for the (3b”)’s.  Seven ways out and still 
counting. 
Finally, note that (3a4”) is compatible with (4a”) but not with (4b”) through (4e”), 
while (3a5”) is compatible with (4b”), (4c”) and (4e”) but not the others.  Parallel 
remarks holding for (3b4”) and (3b5”), we find that there are four more Rawlsian ways 
out offered by the Bočvar/Smiley logic.  That’s eleven ways out in total, for k = a or k = 
b.  One begins to suspect that, with our revised Rawlsian second premise – (2”) – we 
might even move to use of the full equivalence (biconditional) operator “≡” from the 
mere entailment (uniconditional) operator “⊃” and still preserve consistency, even 
though this constitutes something of a strengthening (within the greater weakening 
presented by the move to trivalence) of the relation that Rawls posits between primary 
goods and lifeplan-satisfaction.  (Indeed, since in the Bočvar/Smiley logic “I”’s are 
assigned to exactly the same valuational combinations under “≡” as they are under “⊃”, 
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we know that we can move to full material equivalence in that case without sacrificing 
consistency.)   
It might be well to interpret a few samples from among these “Rawlsian ways 
out” pursuant to the neo-Rawlsian intuition underwriting the revised versions (2”) and 
(3”) of premises (2) and (3).  First consider the complete set of premises themselves.  
Premise (1) still holds that primary good indices are “objectively” interpersonally 
ordinally equivalent – that is, that one bundle “objectively” equals or exceeds another for 
me if and only if it does so for you.  Premise (2”) in turn holds that primary goods indices 
and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are in some sense “indeterminately,” or “not 
fully knowably,” or “not legitimately politically-cognizably,” “‘objectively’/ 
‘subjectively’ intrapersonally quasi-ordinally related” – that is, perhaps, that one bundle’s 
“objectively” equaling or exceeding another bundle for me generally can be expected to, 
but cannot or should not (for purposes of a political conception of justice) fully 
knowably, result in its yielding equal or greater “private” or “subjective” lifeplan-
satisfaction to me.  (The relation is one of uniconditional implication as we have 
interpreted it, though as suggested in the previous paragraph the weakening posed by the 
move to trivalence will allow us to preserve consistency even if we “strengthen” the “not 
fully knowable” relation to full ordinal equivalence.)  Premise (3”) holds that degrees or 
levels of lifeplan-satisfaction yielded by primary goods are in some sense 
“indeterminately,” “not fully knowably,” or “not legitimately politically-congnizably,” 
“‘subjectively’ interpersonally ordinally equivalent” – that is, perhaps, that one primary 
goods bundle’s yielding equal or greater “private” or “subjective” lifeplan-satisfaction 
than another to me generally will, but again cannot or should not (for purposes of a 
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political conception of justice) be thought fully knowably, jointly to entail its doing the 
same for you.   
What fuller sense are we to make of these three claims respecting primary goods 
and lifeplan-satisfaction?  I propose the following:  We know that primary goods are 
“objective” things exterior to the person and open to reliable public inspection, and that 
they therefore present no insuperable epistemic or political difficulties in principle as 
regards verifiable and politically cognizable observation and measurement; your and my 
holding the same bundle amounts, reliably and cognizably, to your and my holding the 
same “amount,” at least in an ordinal if not in a cardinal sense (premise (1)).56  We also 
know that it is reasonable to suppose (or, as Rawls does, definitionally to stipulate) that 
more of these goods are better (more lifeplan-satisfying) than less in view of their 
usefulness in the pursuit of lifeplans – they are, from the point of view of lifeplan-
satisfaction, “normal” goods – but, owing to difficulties attending the would-be 
consistently reliable observation and (cardinal or even ordinal) measurement of such 
“subjective” imponderables as lifeplan-satisfactions, in addition to the “publicity 
constraint”57 placed by a political conception of justice upon the legitimate cognizability 
of ineluctably “private” or “subjective” imponderables, we cannot and need not ever act 
as though we knew with full confidence that more primary goods in all cases 
determinately succeed, ceteris paribus, in bringing about more lifeplan-satisfaction; it is 
only a reasonable supposition or “working hypothesis” – a matter of “common sense” or 
“background knowledge” behind the veil of ignorance, perhaps – in characterizing and 
implementing justice, which latter tasks include selecting an appropriate distribuendum 
(premise (2”)).  Finally, we know it also reasonable to suppose, in view of primary 
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goods’ multiple uses, instrumental fungibility (Rawls calls them “all-purpose means”58) 
and “normality” from the point of view of lifeplan-satisfaction, as well as in view of their 
“objective” invariance in interpersonal holdings (premise (1)), that there will be in theory 
some correlation between one primary goods bundle’s lifeplan-superiority over another 
for me and a similar lifeplan-superiority for you, but again owing to those 
aforementioned difficulties and related political constraints attending the would-be 
consistently reliable observation, measurement and anything but “background” salience 
of such ineluctably “private” or “subjective” imponderables as lifeplan-satisfaction, we 
cannot ever know or maintain with full confidence or legitimacy that this relation holds 
either; it too, like (2”), is a reasonable bit of “common sense,” “background knowledge,” 
general supposition or “working hypothesis” in characterizing and implementing justice, 
which includes selecting an appropriate distribuendum (premise (3”)).  It seems to me 
that this represents a fully coherent articulation of the (“pragmatic,” “political”) Rawlsian 
view of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction that not only avoids the inconsistency 
found by Roemer in Rawls’s own articulation, but that also is truer – because more 
thoroughgoing in it faithfulness – to Rawls’s own intuitions than is the literal Rawlsian 
articulation itself (as quoted by Roemer) or Risse’s proposal simply to drop (2)).59 
One particular “Rawlsian way out” noted above seems to cohere especially 
attractively with this re-reading of the three Rawlsian premises.  We observed, several 
pages up, that (3a1”) and (4e”) were compatible.  A ready intuitive interpretation of these 
propositions pursuant to the general understanding of Rawls here proposed would run: 
“Primary goods bundle m objectively equals or exceeds primary goods bundle n for 
person a, but we cannot know or act as if we knew with certainty, even though it is safe 
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as a matter of common sense to assume as “background knowledge” out from behind the 
veil of ignorance, that it subjectively equals or exceeds that bundle for her; the latter is 
simply a reasonable background supposition for the purposes of political justice” (3a1”).  
And: “Not only can we not know or act as if we knew with certainty that primary goods 
bundle m subjectively equals or exceeds bundle n for person a, we cannot know or act as 
if we knew with certainty whether it does so for person b either; again, this is simply a 
reasonable general supposition for the purposes of political justice” (4e”).  Again, it 
seems to me that these are entirely reasonable things to say, that they are consistent one 
with the other, and that they are fully in conformity with the spirit of the intuitive reading 
of the revised Rawlsian premises respecting primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction 
offered in the previous paragraph – a reading, and revisions, which again appear more 
fully faithful to Rawlsian intuitions, as well as more internally harmonious, than are 
Rawls’s articulated premises themselves.  Other Rawlsian ways out assayed above are 
perhaps more difficult to square with the proposed intuitive reading of the revised 
premises.  But we need but one set, and perhaps it will be well for now to leave things at 
that. 
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3 There is, technically, a critical distinction between bivalence and tertium non datur.  The former 
constitutes a semantic characterization of any formal system in which all well-formed formulae possess one 
or the other of two semantic valuations (generally truth or falsity).  Tertium non datur, on the other hand, 
constitutes a syntactic characterization of any formal system in which “∀ ∨ ¬∀” is derivable as a theorem.  
Most formal systems, including many considered in the present paper, conform to or depart from both 
characterizations together.  But it is well to bear in mind that the two characterizations can part company in 
some cases – e.g., in Kleene’s system, considered infra, Part 3, which at least in its intended interpretation 
is bivalent but not subject to tertium non datur (the “third” value is not intended to supplement truth and 
falsity, but to express undecidability as between the two), and in van Fraassen’s system, considered infra, 
Part 4.1, in which “∀ ∨ ¬∀” remains a theorem (and tertium non datur therefore holds), but in which not 
all well-formed formulae are valuated.  Reasons for choosing one such system or another are addressed in 
both Parts 3 and 4. 
 
4 Roemer, note 1, p. 168, says that “[t]he converse … must also be true, by reference to” a simple 
implicative claim made by Rawls.  If by “converse” Roemer means contrapositive, he is of course correct, 
but not very interestingly so.  If, by contrast, he means that from “if ∀ then ∃” one may infer “if ∃ then ∀,” 
he is invalidly “affirming the consequent.”  The force of this observation is not diminished by the 
distinction between material (i.e., extensional) equivalence and ordinal equivalence, particularly if 
bivalence be rejected.  Ordinal equivalence, as defined infra, is simply a special case of material 
equivalence, also defined infra. 
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5 We could imagine a three-valued logic, for example, in which “∀ ⊃ ∃” is not equivalent to “¬∃ 
⊃ ¬∀”.  If ∀ were assigned the third semantic value, construed, say, as “indeterminacy,” and ∃ were 
assigned the value “true,” the first formula might take the value “true” while the second took the value 
“indeterminate” in a logic with weak material implication in which the truth of a consequent sufficed to 
confer truth on the conditional, and the falsity of an antecedent sufficed to confer the (non-“false”) value of 
the consequent on the full conditional.  (Assuming, of course, that this logic also bore a negation operator 
“¬” which “reversed” the valuation of a true or false sentential formula and left that of a third-valued 
formula invariant.)  And in intuitionist logic, in which tertium non datur does not hold, i.e. in which “∀ ∨ 
¬∀” is not tautologous, “¬∃ ⊃ ¬∀” does not entail “∀ ⊃ ∃”.  More on these matters infra, Parts 3 and 4.2. 
  
6 The expression is Risse’s.  Note 2, p. 16. 
  
7 For those conversant with the symbolism, I follow Whitehead-Russellian practice with three 
exceptions:  I replace the W-R tilde (which I put to different use in Part III) with “¬,” the W-R conjunctive 
“.” with “∧” (by analogy to “∨” and to avoid confusion with dots put to another use), and the W-R 
universal quantifier “(x) Μx” with “∀x: Μx” (for parallelism with the existential quantifier “∃x: Μx”).  I 
also replace parentheses with dots in a manner slightly departing from theirs, again in order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion.   See generally A. N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1910; Cambridge Mathematical Library Edition to *56, 1997), pp. 4f.  
 
 
8   See, e.g., Rawls, note 1, p. 95: “It is worth noting that [the interpretation of expectations in 
terms of primary goods possession] represents, in effect, an agreement to compare men’s situations solely 
by reference to things which it is assumed that all prefer more of.  This seems the most feasible way to 
establish a publicly recognized objective measure, that is, a common measure that reasonable persons can 
accept.  Whereas there cannot be a similar agreement on how to estimate happiness as defined, say, by 
men’s success in executing their rational plans, much less on the intrinsic value of those plans.”  Also John 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 2001), p. 60:  Primary goods 
“belong to a partial conception of the good that citizens, who affirm a plurality of conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines, can agree upon for the purpose of making interpersonal comparisons required for 
workable political principles.”  And Risse, note 2, pp. 8-10, on primary goods’ relation to Rawls’s 
“publicity condition” or “—constraint.” 
 
9 I deliberately leave an ambiguity in the claim as stated.  It might mean that it is not the case that 
for all “you” and “I,” any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or exceeds another such bundle for me 
if and only if it does so for you.  (This is the rendering I have settled on and formalized below.)  Or it might 
mean that for all “you” and “I,” it is not the case that any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or 
exceeds another such bundle for me if and only if it does so for you.  (A formal rendering would be 
“∀x,y,i,j: ¬ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).”)  In a bivalent logic, the former rendition amounts to a claim that for at 
least one pair of persons, one bundle will subjectively equal or exceed a second bundle for one of those 
persons while the second bundle exceeds the first for the other person; whereas the second rendering would 
be equivalent to the claim that for any two people, one bundle will subjectively equal or exceed another 
bundle for one of those persons only when the other bundle exceeds it for the other person.  The latter 
seems surely to be a stronger claim than Rawls would wish to make.  (Note, though, that his 
incommensurability intuition would appear to stand in some tension with either – another reason to 
consider departing from standard logics in Parts 3 and 4.)  I leave the ambiguity in the informally stated 
premise, however, because I believe Rawls implicitly to be relying on the possibility of trivalence or some 
syntactic counterpart, in which case the two interpretations of (3) do not part ways so radically, and in 
which case both seem worth considering.  I treat the logical consequences of each interpretation under 
conditions of trivalence – showing that one such set of consequences indeed properly includes the other – 
in Part 3.    
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10 These observations also seem to rule out any useful Rawlsian recourse to so-called “free logics” 
or “Meinongian semantics,” which amount to classical logics with restricted quantificational domains.  See 
generally Ermano Bencivenga, “Free Logics,” in D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner, eds., Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic, Vol. III: Alternatives to Classical Logic (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985).  Because these 
“alternative logics” do not appear to hold any Rawlsian promise, I do not treat of them here. 
 
11 In so far as “nonsense” is assimilated to “paradox,” and logics meant to accommodate the latter 
(misleadingly) named “nonsense logics,” I do treat of them.  Please see next paragraph, and exposition of 
the systems of Bočvar, Kleene, and their followers infra, Part 3.4.  On three-valued “quantum logic,” its 
justification and utility, see, e.g., G. Birkhoff & John von Neumann, “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics,” 
Annals of Mathematics 37 (1936): 823-43; P. Destouches-Février, “Les Relations d’Incertitude de 
Heisenberg et la Logique,” Comptes Rendus de L’Académie des Seances 204 (1937): 481-831; Hans 
Reichenbach, Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1944); Patrick 
Suppes, ed., Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976); Hilary Putnam, 
“How to Think Quantum-Logically,” Synthese 29 (1974): 55-61; Hilary Putnam, “The Logic of Quantum 
Mechanics,” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1: Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1979), pp. 174-97; E. Beltrametti & Bass van Fraassen, Current Issues in Quantum Logic (New 
York: Plenum, 1981); and M. L. dalla Chiara, “Quantum Logic,” in Gabbay & Guenther, note 16, pp. 427-
70. 
  
12 Whitehead & Russell, note 13, pp. 37f., 161f.  Also Frank P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, 
D.H. Mellor, ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), pp. 183f. 
 
13 “Nonsense”-consignment is, of course, the Whitehead & Russell strategy.  Cf. remarks on the 
“vicious circle principle” and rectificatory “theory of types” in Whitehead & Russell, note 13, pp. 37f., 
161f.  Cognate or analogous stratification strategies turn up in the canonical work of a number of set-
theorists, notably Bernays, Fraenkel, von Neumann, Quine, Skolem and Zermelo, and are famously 
employed by A. Tarski, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen,” Studia Philosophia, I 
(1935): 261-405, reprinted in English as “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Alfred 
Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, J. H. Woodger, ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2d ed. 1983); and 
S. Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 690-716.  Another means of 
handling paradox without positing a new semantic value is via so-called “paraconsistent logics,” which 
avert difficulties by withdrawal of the classical sanction of inference to any proposition what ever from a 
contradiction.  I see no interest in these logics for Rawlsians.  See generally Diderik Batens et al., eds., 
Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic (Baldock: Research Studies Press, 2000); Graham Priest et al., 
Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989).  Ronald Dworkin 
illuminatingly considers the relations between bivalence, tertium non datur and putatively undecidable 
legal questions in “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?,” New York University Law Review 53 
(1978), reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard, 1985), pp. 119-45.  See 
also Ronald Dworkin, “No Right Answer,” in P. M. S. Hacker & Joseph Raz, eds., Law, Morality and 
Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977); and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard, 1977), Chapter 13.  
 
14 One might argue that “the largest prime” is of a different sort than “my mother’s [perhaps non-
existent] cousin,” in that the former, unlike the latter, cannot just “happen” to lack a bearer.  Three replies:  
1) If, then, the term is deemed nonsensical, we can simply drop it as a prototypical example here.  2) “The 
largest prime” certainly would not seem to be nonsensical in the way, say, that “the prime largest” would 
be.  If anything, it would seem more “paradoxical” than “meaningless,” in which case I simply shift it to 
the previous category.  Finally 3) Some intuitionists and constructivists would likely find the expression in 
fact to possess a denotation – that singled out by a particular connotation that they would ascribe to it, viz., 
“the largest prime thus far constructed.”  More on that view of things infra, Part 4.2.  
 
15 Though not, of course, in the view of Whitehead & Russell, who analyze such propositions as 
incorporating (false) existential claims.  Whitehead & Russell, note 13, pp. 66f., 173f.; B. Russell, “On 
Denoting,” Mind 14 (1905): 479-93, reprinted in Russell (ed. R.C. Marsh), Logic and Knowledge: Essays 
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1901-1950 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 41-56.  The truth-valueless analysis, of course, is 
associated with Frege and with Strawson.  Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1894), translated into English as “On Sinn and Bedeutung,” in 
A. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 346-61; Peter Strawson, “On Referring,” 
Mind 59 (1950): 320-44, reprinted in Strawson, Logico-Linguistic Papers (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 1-
27.  See also Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), for state-of-the art 
treatment of the Russellian position; and M. A. E. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: 
Duckworth, 1973), for state-of-the-art treatment of the Fregean.  The theory of denotation has of course 
undergone a great deal of ferment in the last several decades, largely in connection with the so-called “new 
theory of reference”.  See, e.g., in addition to works just cited and sources cited therein, Keith Donnellan, 
“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Philosophical Review 75 (1966); Keith Donnellan, “Proper Names 
and Identifying Descriptions,” in Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman, eds. Semantics of Natural 
Languages (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972); Keith Donnellan, “Speaking of Nothing,” Philosophical Review 83 
(1974); David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in Joseph Almong et al., eds., Themes from Kaplan (Oxford: 
University Press, 1989); David Kaplan, “On the Logic of Demonstratives,” in Peter French et al., eds. 
Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1979); David Kaplan, “Quantifying In,” in Donald Davidson & Jaakko Hintikka, eds., Words and 
Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969); Saul Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), and in Davidson & Harman, op. cit., pp. 253-355; John McDowell, 
“The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,” Mind 86 (1977): 159-85, reprinted in his Meaning, 
Knowledge and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998), pp. 171-98; J. M. McDowell, “Truth-Value Gaps,” in 
L. J. Cohen et al., eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982), 
pp. 299-314, reprinted in McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, pp. 199-213; Putnam, Reason, 
Truth and History, and Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason, note 48, passim.; and of course 
the seminal W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1959); and W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT, 1960). 
 
16 See, e.g., L. A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets,” Information and Control 8 (1965): 338-53; L. A. Zadeh, 
“Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning,” Synthese 30 (1975): 407-25; J. Pavelka, “On Fuzzy Logic. I-
III,” Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und den Grundlagen der Mathematik 25 (1979): 45-52, 119-34, 
447-64; P. Hájek, Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998); V. Novák, Fuzzy Sets and 
Their Applications (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1989); Gottwald, note 37, Chapters 18, 19; Bolc & Borowik, 
note 37, Chapters 8, 9.  Also B. Urquhart, “Many-Valued Logic,” in Gabbay & Guenthner, note 16, pp. 71-
116; M. A. E. Dummett, “Wang’s Paradox,” Synthese 30 (1975): 301-24, reprinted in Dummett, Truth and 
Other Enigmas, note 48; and Hilary Putnam, “Vagueness and Alternative Logic,” Erkenntnis 19 (1983): 
297-314, reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason, note 48, pp. 271-86.  
Precursors to “fuzzy logics” in the form of many-valued logics construed or construable as logics of 
“partial truth” or “verisimilitude” are assayed in E. Post, “Introduction to the General Theory of Elementary 
Propositions,” American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1921): 163-85; and K. M. Popper, Objective 
Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972).  Many-valued logic construed as “probability logic” is investigated 
by Jan Łukasiewicz, note 36, whose work is further discussed infra.  Professor Dworkin briefly considers 
vagueness as a possible reason for denying the decidability of legal questions in Dworkin, note 19. 
 
17 Herewith a modified version of a well-known Aristotelian hypothetical.  Aristotle, De 
Interpretatione, Book ix, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: University Press, 1963). 
 
18 I thus think it mistaken to argue, as some have done, that the Aristotelian objection to 
determinately truth-valued future contingents involves a modal fallacy, viz., an illicit elision from “□ (∀ ⊃ 
∃)” to “∀ ⊃ □∃”.  See S. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time (New Haven: Yale, 1967).  Also A. N. Prior, “Three-
Valued Logic and Future Contingents,” Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1983): 317-26; A. N. Prior, Time and 
Modality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957).  It is not necessary for Aristotle (or Łukasiewicz, discussed infra, Part 
III.D, who endorses him) to argue to the necessity of a consequent from the necessity of the implication 
involving that consequent.  He need only argue that the present conferral of truth-value upon statements 
involving the future must, to be intelligible, be warranted by some current state of the world; then that for 
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any such state to meet the appointed task it must unalterably determine that future state.  Cf. similar 
observations in connection with “antirealism” about the past and about counterfactuals, infra Part 4.2. 
 
19 John Lucas has famously – and controversially – argued that some of the very results derived by 
Gödel, some recursive relatives of which one three-valued logic considered infra – Kleene’s – is designed 
to accommodate, also supply a refutation of physical determinism.  J.R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), pp. 114f.  Also J. R. Lucas, “Minds, Machines and Gödel,” Philosophy 36 
(1961): 112-27; J. R. Lucas, “Mechanism: A Rejoinder,” Philosophy 45 (1970): 149-51.  Contra: David 
Lewis, “Lucas Against Mechanism,” Philosophy 44 (1969): 231-33; David Lewis, “Lucas Against 
Mechanism II,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 373-76. 
 
20 Of course, David Lewis, Counterfactuals. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).  Lewis is an unapologetic 
realist with respect to the possible worlds in terms of which counterfactualist semantics are understood; but 
he essays objections throughout his treatise.  See also Dummett, note 48. 
 
21 Cf. remarks on intuitionism at Part 4.2, infra. 
 
22 John Broome apparently also would see none.  See his “Incommensurable Values,” in Roger 
Crisp & Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: 
University Press, 1999), pp. 21-38, reprinted in John Broome, Ethics Out of Economics (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1999), pp. 145-61, at 154: “I take the question of vagueness as a red herring when we are 
interested in the importance of incommensurability.”  See also citations to Dworkin, note 19.  “Fuzzy” sets 
and logics have, however, been found useful by some economists in tackling certain measurement 
problems.  E.g., K. Basu, “Axioms for Fuzzy Measures of Inequality,” Mathematical Social Science, 14 
(1987); E. Chiappero Martinetti, “A New Approach to Evaluation of Well-being and Poverty by Fuzzy Set 
Theory,” Giornale degli Economisti, 53 (1994); E. Ok, “Fuzzy Measurement of Income Inequality: A Class 
of Fuzzy Inequality Measures,” Social Choice and Welfare, 12 (1995); and other sources cited in A. K. 
Sen, On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973; “Expanded Edition,” 1997), pp. 121, 200. 
 
23 I find occasion to puzzle over the putative sense of this expression infra, Part 5, esp. note 57. 
 
24 Even treating “7/0” as simply “undefined” might seem, at least from one point of view, 
troublingly ad hoc.  Assigning it the value “∞” would appear at least as plausible in view of the latter’s role 
as endpoint of the limit operator in such terms as “lim (n →∞) 1/n.”  Since 1/∞, in effect, plays a role very 
much like 0, there is a certain principled symmetry in the notion that 1/0 is ∞. 
 
25 Please see note 29. 
 
26 Surely not that level-comparison entails (some manner of “incommensurable”) lifeplan-
comparison.  Why would, and how could, that be?  How would such an entailment argument run?  More on 
this at Part 5.  
  
27 Those more concerned with the elegant arithmetic or algebraic formulatability of the logic’s 
transformation rules might well prefer a set such as {1, ½, 0}, in which case the effects of the classical 
sentential operators are readily characterized, e.g., as follows: ¬ ∀ = 1 -∀; ∀ ∨ ∃ = max ∀, ∃; 
∀ ∧ ∃ = min ∀, ∃; etc.  Such a system (or some analogue) is readily extended to the n-valued, even 
the infinitely many-valued, case.  But such logics are not applicable to any circumstance that need concern 
us here. 
 
28 This is the “max ∀, ∃” option, note 33. 
 
29 This would entail a “min ∀, ∃” characterization, note 33. 
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30 So argue Hilary Putnam, “Three-Valued Logic,” Philosophical Studies 8 (1957): 73-80, 
reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1: Mathematics, Matter and Method, note 17, pp. 166-73; and 
Reichenbach, note 17. 
 
31 See generally Siegfried Gottwald, A Treatise on Many-Valued Logics (Baldock: Research 
Studies Press, 2001), pp. 385-92 & passim.; Leonard Bolc & Piotr Borowik, Many-Valued Logics 1: 
Theoretical Foundations (Berlin: Springer, 1992), pp. 63-77 & passim.; Susan Haack, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy 
Logic (Chicago: U. Chi., 1996), pp. 168-77.  Also the venerable J. B. Rosser & A. R. Turquette, Many-
Valued Logics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1952); and Nicholas Rescher, Many-Valued Logic (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1969). 
 
32 Please recall that it was necessary to resolve the question’s analogue in the bivalent case.  Note 
14. 
 
33 Jan Łukasiewicz, “O Logice Trówartósciowej,” Ruch Filozoficny 5 (1929): 170-71, translated 
into English as “On Three-Valued Logic,” in S. McCall, ed., Polish Logic (Oxford: University Press, 
1967), pp. 16-18; Jan Łukasiewicz, “Philosophische Bemerkungen zu Mehrvertigen Systemen des 
Aussagenkalküls,” Comptes Rendus Séances Société des Sciences et Lettres Varsowie, cl. 3, 23 (1930): 51-
77, translated into English as “Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic,” in 
McCall, op. cit., pp. 40-65; Jan Łukasiewicz & Alfred Tarski, “Untersuchungen über den Aussagenkalkül,” 
Comptes Rendus Séances Societé des Sciences et Lettres Varsovie, cl. III, 23 (1930): 30-50, reprinted in 
English as “Investigations into the Sentential Calculus” in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, note 19, pp. 
38-59.  Łukasiewicz also generalizes his Ł3 logic to the four- and many-valued cases, construing the former 
as a modal and the latter as a “probability logic.”  His and other such systems with this interpretation are 
surveyed in Bolc & Borowik, note 37, Chapter 10.  An extension of Ł3 to functionally complete 
axiomatization can be found in J. Słupecki, “Der volle dreiwertige Aussagenkalkül,” Comptes Rendus 
Séances Societé des Sciences et Lettres Varsovie, cl. III, 29 (1936): 9-11.  Similar work in the many-valued 
case appears in B. Sobociński, “Axiomatization of Certain Many-Valued Systems of the Theory of 
Deduction,” Roczniki prac naukowycu zrzeszenia asystentów Univwersytetu Józefa Pitsudskiegow 
Warszawa 1 (1936): 399-419.  
   
34 I call an “∀ ∧ ¬∀” conjunction a “firm” or “hard” contradiction, an “∀ ∧ ∼∀” or “∼∀ ∧ ¬∀” 
conjunction a “soft” contradiction. 
 
35 D. Bočvar, “Ob odnom trechznačnom isčis lenii I ego primenii k analizaparadoksov 
klassicčeskogo rasširennogo funkcional’nogo isčislenija,” Matématčéskij Sbornik 4 (1938): 287-308, 
translated into English as “On a Three-Valued Calculus and Its Application to the Analysis of the 
Paradoxes of the Classical Extended Functional Calculus,” History & Philosophy of Logic 2 (1939): 87-
112; D. Bočvar, “K voprosu o neprotivorečivosti odnogo trechzanačnogo isčislenija,” Matématčéskij 
Sbornik 12 (1943): 353-69.  Bočvar, a bit misleadingly in light of English connotation, characterized his as 
a “nonsense logic.”  His work is carried on by a colleague with whom he coauthored a number of papers 
later in his career.  See, e.g., V. K. Finn, An Axiomatization of Some Propositional Calculii and Their 
Algebras (Moscow: Vsiechšiznyi Institut Naučeskoi Informacii Academii Nauk SSR, 1972).  Other later 
work taking its cue from Bočvar includes S. Halldén, “The Logic of Nonsense,” Uppsala Universitets 
arsskrift 9 (1949): 132-46; L. Åqvist, “Reflections on the Logic of Nonsense,” Theoria 28 (1962): 138-58; 
K. Segerberg, “A Contribution to Nonsense Logic,” Theoria 31 (1965): 199-217; and K. Piróg-Rzepecka, 
Systemy Nonsense-Logics (Warszawa: Wrocklaw, 1977). 
 
36 T. J. Smiley, “Sense Without Denotation,” Analysis 20 (1960): 125-35.  Work along similar 
lines, by a theoretical linguist, can be found in U. Blau, Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache: ihre Syntax, 
Semantik und Anwendung in der Sprachanalyse (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978). 
 
37 S. C. Kleene, “On Notation for Ordinal Numbers,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 3 (1938): 150-55; 
S. C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1952).  Cf. Kurt Gödel, “Über 
formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter System, I,” Monatschafte für 
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Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931): 173-98, reprinted with English translation en face in Kurt Gödel, 
Collected Works, Vol. I: Publications 1929-36, Solomon Feferman et al., eds. (Oxford: University Press, 
1986), pp. 145-95; Kurt Gödel, “Zum Entscheidungsproblem des logische Funktionenkalküls,” 
Monatschafte für Mathematik und Physik, 40 (1933): 433-43, reprinted with English translation en face in 
Collected Works, op. cit., pp. 307-36; Alonzo Church, “An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number 
Theory,” American Journal of Mathematics 58 (1936): 345-63; Alonzo Church, “A Note on the 
Entscheidungsproblem,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1936): 40-41.  Generally Martin Davis, 
Computability and Unsolvability (New York: Dover, 1983).   
 
38 P. Woodruff, “Logic and Truth-Value Gaps,” in K. Lambert, ed., Philosophical Logic 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), pp. 121-42.   
 
39 Bass C. van Fraassen, “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic,” Journal of 
Philosophy 63 (1966): 481-95; Bass C. van Fraassen, “Presupposition, Implication and Self-Reference,” 
Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 136-52; Bass C. van Fraassen, “Presuppositions, Supervaluations and 
Free Logic,” in K. Lambert, ed., The Logical Way of Doing Things (New Haven: Yale, 1969), pp. 67-91.  
See also McDowell, “Truth Value Gaps,” note 21, and Woodruff, note 44.  The applicability of 
supervaluation to problems of vagueness is treated in Kit Fine, “Vagueness, Truth and Logic,” Synthese 30 
(1975): 265-300.  Professor Broome briefly considers supervaluations in connection with vagueness in the 
piece cited at note 28, and in “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?,” in Ruth Chang, ed., 
Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998), pp. 67-89, 
reprinted in Broome, Ethics Out of Economics, note 28, pp. 123-44.  
 
40 See L. E. J. Brouwer, “Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics,” Proceedings of the Tenth 
International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1949), pp. 1235-49; Arend Heyting, 
Intuitionism (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1966); M. A. E. Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977). 
 
41 Frege in effect raised long ago a potential pitfall standing in the way of this reinterpretation of 
classical negation; it appears to leave the content of “contrariness” or “contraindication” mysterious.  
Contrariness, that is, seems as though it might be parasitic upon simple contradiction.  Gottlob Frege, “Die 
Verneinung. Eine logische Untersuchung,” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918): 
143-57, translated into English as “Negation,” in Beaney, note 21, pp. 346-61.  But we need not resolve this 
conundrum here.  An excellent survey of efforts to do so (and more), by a linguist, is Laurence R. Horn, A 
Natural History of Negation (Chicago: CSLI, 2000). 
 
42 Dummett, note 46.  Also M. A. E. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 
1978); M. A. E. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 1991); M. A. E. 
Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford: Oxford, 1993); Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1992); Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).  
Hilary Putnam in the past two decades also has shown sympathy, via his “internal realism,” with antirealist 
views, as has Nelson Goodman via his “irrealism”.  Putnam’s point of departure is the “new theory of 
reference” referenced at note 21, Goodman’s the oft-unobserved indeterminacy of predicate expressions 
and the world-constitutive consequences of conceptualization.  Quine, note 21, from whose “radical 
indeterminacy of translation” both Putnam and Goodman seem to have drawn far-reaching conclusions, has 
not been entirely comfortable with the extensions drawn by his erstwhile pupils.   See, e.g., Hilary Putnam, 
Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: University Press, 1979); Hilary 
Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: University Press, 1981); Hilary Putnam, Philosophical 
Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason (Cambridge: University Press, 1985); Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces 
of Realism (LaSalle: Open Court, 1988); Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1992); Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard, 4th ed., 1983); Nelson 
Goodman, Ways of World-Making (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).  We seem to have traveled some distance 
since the day when the formidable likes of Ramsey characterized intuitionists and finitists as posing a 
“Bolshevik menace” to logic and mathematics.  See Ramsey, note 18, p. 219.  Dworkin, note 19, cites 
Dummett early in his discussion of bivalence and the “no right answer” thesis in connection with “hard 
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cases” at law.  He also takes note of the possible distinction, albeit in different terminology, between 
negation and contraindication. 
 
43 The “Kantian” argument would take the form: “Language-understanding and –meaning are 
possible only because people can be corrected in their usages, and they are corrected by ascription of the 
forthrightly normative words “true” and “false,” which amount to ascriptions of rightness or wrongness to 
assertions by reference to observable states of the world.  Haack, note 37, pp. 105-08, argues that it is no 
more difficult to account for the meaningfulness of sentences understood in terms of (perhaps sometimes 
unascertainable or even non-existent) truth-conditions than it is to account for that of sentences understood 
in terms of assertibility-conditions.  (An Ockamite reply might be that Haack has assumed the burden of 
proof to lie on the wrong side of the divide, given that, in order to explain language-acquisition, language-
understanding and language-meaning, no conception of truth beyond assertibility is necessary.)  Herewith 
the tip of a vast argumentative iceberg that can safely be passed over here.  Cf. the polemics of Dummett 
and Putnam, note 48, in particular, which often engage (hostile) “realists” by name; also McDowell, 
Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, note 21, pp. 395-365; and J. McDowell, “Truth Conditions, Bivalence 
and Verification,” in G. Evans & J. McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1976) pp. 138-61, reprinted in McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, note 21, pp. 3-28, 
who is sophisticatedly skeptical of antirealist and cognate claims; and Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-
Realism (Oxford: University Press, 1993), same.  Even those who disagree with Dummett’s arguments 
about sentential meaning and understanding can, and often do, concede the possibility of truth-valueless 
meaningful statements, and that intuitionist logic might usefully model such phenomena. 
 
44 See in particular Dummett’s writing on McTaggart and “The Reality of the Past” in his Truth 
and Other Enigmas, note 48.  Also his essay “Truth,” in the same collection: Example of person who dies 
young without ever having found occasion to manifest bravery or cowardice, with consequence that it 
would seem peculiar to hold it determinately true or false that this person was “brave.” 
 
45 A. Heyting, “Die Formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik,” Sitzungsberichte der 
Preussichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Physikal.-Mathemat. Klasse II (1930): 42-56.  Also 
Heyting, note 46; and I. Johanssen, “Der Minimalkalkül, ein Redazierte Intuitionsiche Formalismus,” 
Compositio Mathematica 4 (1936): 119-36, which drops Heyting’s tenth axiom but does not affect the 
results derived here.  See generally M. C. Fitting, Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics 
(Dordrecht: Reidel 1983); and Bolc & Borowik, note 37, Chapter 5.  It should be noted in passing that it 
has been proved that there does not exist any single many-valued logic whose set of tautologies is identical 
to the set of tautologies derivable in axiomatized intuitionist logic.  See Kurt Gödel, “Zum intuitionistische 
Aussagenkalkül,” Anzeiger Akademic der Wissenschaften Wien, Math.-naturwisse. Klass 69 (1932): 65-66, 
reprinted with English translation en face in Collected Works, note 43, pp. 223-25; and S. Jaśkowski, 
“Recherches sur le système de la logique intuitioniste, ” Actes du Congrès Internationale de Philosophie 
Scientifique, 6 (1936): 58-61. 
 
46 Łukasiewicz also gave an explicitly modal reading to his four-valued logic in Jan Łukasiewicz, 
“Philosophische Bemerkungen,” note 39.  See also Jan Łukasiewicz, “A System of Modal Logic,” Journal 
of Computing Systems 1 (1953): 111-49; and Jan Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic (Oxford: University 
Press, 1957). 
 
47 Significantly, modal logics are sometimes characterized as “contextual” logics, “context” being 
understood in distinctly epistemic terms.  (The “context” in question is that in which the reasoner, in all of 
her epistemic finitude, finds herself.)  
 
48 S4 is the modal logic resulting from addition of □-elimination (i.e., □∀ ⊃ ∀) and □-repetition 
(i.e., □∀ ⊃ □□∀) to the “basic contextual logic” known as “■”.  The latter is simply standard first-order 
prepositional logic with the addition of the “□” and “◊” operators and their rules (e.g., □¬ ∀ ⊃ ¬◊∀, ◊∀ ⊃ 
¬□¬∀, etc.).  See generally Fitting, note 51.  Also R. B. Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Logics,” 
Synthese 13 (1961): 303-22, reprinted in her Modalities: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: University Press, 
1993), pp. 3-30; C. I. Lewis, “Alternative Systems of Logic,” Monist 42 (1932): 481-507.  
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49 J. C. C. McKinsey & Alfred Tarski, “Some Theorems About the Sentential Calculi of Lewis and 
Heyting,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948): 1-15.  Also Gödel, note 51; Saul Kripke, “Semantical 
Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I,” in J. Crossley & M. A. E. Dummett, eds., Formal Systems and Recursive 
Functions (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1963), pp. 92-129; Fitting, note 51. 
 
50 J. Dugundji, “Note on a Property of Matrices for Lewis’ and Langford’s Calculii of 
Propositions,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (1940): 150-51.  
 
51 Rawls appears to hold that lifeplan-satisfactions are incommensurable because lifeplans – or at 
any rate the “conceptions of the good” that are expressed in lifeplans – are incommensurable.  See John 
Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and 
Beyond (Cambridge: University Press, 1982), pp. 159-85, at 161, reprinted in John Rawls, Collected 
Papers (Cambridge: Harvard, 1999), pp. 359-87, at 361.  But it is difficult to understand what 
“mensurability” or “incommensurability” even might mean, let alone whether they might be ascribable, in 
connection with such non-magnitudinal entities as “lifeplans” or “conceptions of the good”.  (It is thus 
difficult to understand what those words might connote in connection not only with interpersonal lifeplan 
comparabilities (premise (3)), but also in connection with intrapersonal primary goods-to-lifeplan 
comparabilities (premise (2)).  The notion of “incommensurable -,” “mensurable -,” or “measurable 
lifeplans” or “— conceptions of the good” is reminiscent of such would-be notions as “discomfited 
polygons” and “exponentiated hairsprays”.)  Whereas the notion of “degree or level of lifeplan-
satisfaction” – a numerical entity – would seem, if operationally meaningful intrapersonally (premise (2)), 
to be operationally meaningful interpersonally (premise (3)) as well. 
 
52 There are extended Rawlsian passages that provide independent ground for ascribing some such 
(complex) intuition to Rawls.  It strikes me as particularly noteworthy that Rawls fuses epistemic and 
moral-political considerations in discussing primary goods.  See, e.g., note 14; and “The Priority of Right 
and Ideas of the Good,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 17 (1988): 251-76, reprinted in Rawls, Collected 
Papers, note 57, pp. 449-72, at 455: “What is crucial is that in introducing [additional primary goods] we 
recognize the limits of the political and the practicable: First, we must stay within the limits of justice as 
fairness as a political conception of justice that can serve as the focus of an overlapping consensus; and 
second, we must respect the constraints of simplicity and availability of information to which any 
practicable political conception (as opposed to comprehensive moral doctrine) is subject.”  See also the 
later reference, on the same page, to “the practical nature of primary goods” (emphasis supplied).  And 
page 456: “Nor does [justice as fairness] try to estimate the extent to which individuals succeed in 
advancing their way of life – their overall scheme of final ends” (emphasis again supplied).  And Rawls, 
note 1, p. 94: “[Justice as fairness] does not look behind the use which persons make of [primary goods] in 
order to measure, much less to maximize, the satisfactions they achieve” (emphasis again supplied).  And 
see Risse, note 2, pp. 10-13, where it is observed that if a “magic machine” able to “look into peoples’ 
minds” were to appear, a “Pandora’s Box” would be opened and the morally relevant informational 
“circumstances of politics” radically altered in such wise as to force us to reconsider, even if not to change, 
our politico-theoretic commitments.   
   
53 Thus by alternatively characterizing the group of transformations that can be applied to 
individual satisfaction-indices without affecting a composite social ordering, we can represent the 
analytical distinctions of intra- and interpersonal measures of satisfaction.  E.g., the group of 
transformations represented by ∀α,β∈ ∧ β >0, ∀u,v∈N: uO*v ≡ (α1 + β1u1, α2 + β2u2, … αn + βnun) O* 
(α1 + β1v1, α2 + β2v2, … αn + βnvn), where N is a Euclidian space indexed by the names of n persons, u and 
v are individual satisfaction-functions likewise indexed, and O* is a social ordering over N – i.e., the group 
of all positive affine transformations of the ordering – preserves intrapersonally cardinal but interpersonally 
incomparable (“CN,” or “CNC”) satisfaction-information across individuals 1 through n.  And the group 
represented by ∀Φ∈{strictly increasing numeric functions}, ∀u,v∈N: uO*v ≡ (Φ(u1), Φ(u2), … Φ(un)) O* 
(Φ(u1), Φ(u2), … Φ(un)) – i.e., all strictly increasing transformations applied one at a time to all 
satisfaction-indices – preserves intrapersonal ordinal but interpersonally full-comparable (“OC,” “OFC,” or 
“co-ordinal”) satisfaction-information across individuals 1 through n.  Thorough summaries of means by 
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which mathematically to characterize various combinations of various forms of intrapersonal and 
interpersonal measurability are Claude d’Aspremont, “Axioms for Social Welfare Ordering,” in Leonid 
Hurwicz et al., eds., Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1985), pp. 19-76, particularly 42f.; and Roemer, note 1, pp. 16f.  The 
method appears to have originated with Professor Sen.  E.g., Sen, note 28; A. K. Sen, Collective Choice 
and Social Welfare (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1970); and A. K. Sen, “On Weights and Measures: 
Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis,” Econonometrica, 45 (1979): 1539-72.  A very 
useful collection of essays treating of the technical and philosophic concerns surrounding intrapersonal and 
interpersonal measurement is Jon Elster & John E. Roemer, eds., Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1991).  For skepticism about the fundamentality of putative differences 
between separate persons and separate temporal “phases” of individual persons, see D. Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons (Oxford: University Press, 1984); and John Broome, Weighing Goods (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1991).  I do not wish to be taken to endorse the latter skepticism.  The skepticism that I express is 
only as to the political, operational or pragmatic significance of the formal distinction between 
measurements of intrapersonal, and of interpersonal, “subjective” phenomena, not the metaphysical 
distinction between persons and “person-phases.”  An early work assimilating persons and time-dated 
person-phases simply for theoretic-cum-expository purposes is Maurice Allais, Economie et Interêt (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1947).  The latter in effect extends to persons Hicks’s method of temporally individuating 
commodities in Value and Capital (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931), and of course anticipates Arrow’s and 
Debreu’s method of individuating state-claims, respectively, in “Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la 
Répartition la Meilleure des Risques,” Econometrie, Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la 
Récherche Scientifique 40 (1953): 41-80; and Theory of Value (New Haven: Cowles, 1954), Chapter 7.  
(Allais also, incidentally, presented a paper along the same lines as Arrow’s at the same colloquium; it 
follows Arrow’s in the cited journal of proceedings.) 
              
54 Please see note 59 for the group-theoretic meanings of these expressions. 
 
55 Risse, note 2, argues that Rawls cannot renounce (1) because primary goods would then “lose 
their ability to guide ‘interpersonal comparisons required for workable political principles,’” p. 16, quoting 
Rawls, Restatement, note 14, p. 60.  Neither can Rawls renounce (3), holds Risse, because “insisting on 
utility comparability (which is what the rejection of that condition amounts to) would unacceptably 
undermine the subjective element in any plausible conception of happiness,” p. 16.  Risse concludes that 
Rawls must renounce (2), even though this “comes at the expense of severing primary goods from 
happiness,” p. 17.  Roemer’s derived contradiction, Risse observes, thus “mak[es] clear how far-reaching 
[Rawls’s contractarian] commitment is,” p. 22.  The possible employment of non-classical logics, I think, 
gives the lie to Risse’s parenthetical (that “insisting on utility comparability” is what rejection of premise 
(3) “amounts to”).  It also casts doubt upon his equating “meaningful[ness]” with “being true or false, 
rather than pointless,” at the top of p. 15.  And employing such a logic in revising both (2) and (3) enables 
us both to retain all of Rawls’s premises – albeit in “softened” form – and to avoid the curious tension that 
seems to me to afflict not only Rawls’s premises (2) and (3) considered jointly, but also Risse’s desire to 
retain “the subjective element in any plausible conception of happiness” while at the same time “severing” 
it completely (rather than only “softly,” as I do here) from the primary goods which Rawlsians – 
reasonably, it seems to me – take to conduce, in some moral-theoretic and pragmatic sense not susceptible 
of precise and reliable measurement, to plausible happiness.  (Note again, in this connection, e.g., the 
Rawlsian passage quoted by Roemer, note 1, at p. 166, and in note 7 supra.)  The final three paragraphs of 
this paper, I believe, convincingly indicate how the formalizations proposed in the remaining pages not 
only spare Rawls the Roemerian inconsistency, but also lend themselves to a more plausible, more 
intuitively complete account of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction than either Rawls or 
Risse has quite mustered.  Each of them, we might say, is ambivalent about subjectivity, while Risse (at 
least) is unnecessarily bivalent about logic; solution lies in univalence about subjectivity and trivalence (or 
its functional equivalent) about logic.  
       
56 There might, of course, be commensurability problems between non-identical bundles – that is, 
there might be an indexing problem where one primary goods vector includes more of component x1 and 
less of component x2 than does another primary goods vector – but this (considerable) problem need not 
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concern us here.  I treat it at length in my forthcoming “The Grammar of Distribution: A Metatheory of 
Justice,” and  “Market-Able Justice: Endowment Equality, Value-Grounded Departures from Equality, and 
Social Exchange.”  For more on the matter, see Richard Arneson, “Primary Goods Reconsidered,” NOUS 24 
(1990): 429-57; Richard Arneson, “Rawls versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political Liberalism,” in V. 
Davian & C. Wolf, eds., The Idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000).  Also Roemer, note 1, and Risse, note 2.  More generally, Broome, note 28, and Chang, 
note 45.  All of these contributions can be can be taken, in effect, for close critiques of premise (1), while 
the present paper is primarily a critique of premises (2) and (3). 
 
57 Please see note 10. 
 
58 Rawls, Restatement, note 14, pp. 60-61. 
 
59 Professor Roemer has suggested, in conversation, that reformalizing the Rawlsian premises 
pursuant to a non-classical logic might constitute too radical or far-reaching a maneuver, leaving 
“everything up for grabs.”  I don’t think that we need harbor such worries – worries which, incidentally, 
seem often to bedevil gifted and scrupulous mathematicians when confronted by non-classical logics.  (Cf. 
Ramsey on intuitionism’s “Bolshevik menace,” note 48.)  As I hope to have indicated in the discussion 
throughout Parts III and IV, the non-classical logics considered in the present paper depart from classical 
logic only in their formal recognitions of meaningful propositions of somehow (metaphysically, 
epistemically, politically-pragmatically, etc.) indeterminate truth-value, their consequent assignments of 
mildly divergent truth-functional meanings to the classical sentential connectives, and/or their sacrifice of 
certain classical tautologies which, in view of the possibility of the aforementioned meaningful 
propositions of indeterminate truth-value, probably ought not to be maintained in any event.  Those logics 
do not seem to pose any threat of unpleasant surprise derivable from Rawlsian premises interpreted in light 
of the countenanced indeterminacies, nor do they seem to threaten any other surprise likely to be found 
unpleasant by Rawlsians.  (As I noted earlier, a full-blown metalogical proof might yield a bit more formal 
confidence on this point – at least as regards possible contradictions – but the intuitive arguments ought to 
suffice.)  All that they do is to offer a means of giving formal expression to what looks to be Rawls’s actual 
three-fold understanding of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction among persons, and to 
do so in a manner that both a) preserves such relations of logical consequence as we should wish to retain 
and b) avoids such paradox as that to which the aforementioned Rawlsian understanding, if mis-formalized 
bivalently, would conduce.  Professor Roemer also has suggested, again in conversation, that a more 
critical inconsistency of which Rawls is guilty comes with his attempt to integrate considerations of 
responsibility into his theory of justice via his accounts both of primary goods and of the “veil of 
ignorance.”  With this claim I am in considerable sympathy, and see no way out for Rawls via any plausible 
formalization or reformalization.  See generally cites to Arneson’s, Roemer’s and my own work at note 62; 
also John Roemer, “Three Egalitarian Views and American Law,” Law and Philosophy, xx (2001): 433-60; 
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998); and Risse, note 2, as well as 
Mathias Risse, “Rawls and Responsibility” (draft, 2 March 2003, on file with the author), who is at pains to 
defend Rawls against this inconsistency charge.  While Professor Risse’s emphasis on the political nature 
of Rawlsian justice constitutes an important corrective to much criticism of Rawls, and provides what I 
believe to be an additional rationale for reformalizing the Rawlsian premises as I have done in this paper 
(rather than for simply dropping premise (2), as Professor Risse proposes), I do not believe that it spares 
Rawls the difficulties over responsibility from which Risse hopes to extricate him.  But that matter is 
reserved for Hockett, note 62.  
    
